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A PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PROGRAM FOR THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY
REBECCA LOVE KOURLISt & JORDAN M. SINGERtt
INTRODUCTION
Federal judges enjoy a degree of freedom from structural political
constraints unrivaled by nearly all of their counterparts on the state
bench. Lifetime appointments shelter district and circuit judges from the
fury of periodic elections or reappointment decisions, allowing them to
focus on judging and other official duties rather than fundraising, elec-
tioneering, or testing the winds of prevailing electoral sentiment. Even
federal magistrate and bankruptcy judges not subject to the guarantees of
Article I are generally more insulated from politics than their state col-
leagues, as their appointments and reappointments remain largely inter-
nal matters.
Many commentators have praised Article III's guarantees of life
tenure and freedom from salary cuts as essential tools to preserve judicial
independence. 1 Far less frequently have the commentators explored the
impact of these guarantees on judicial accountability. Rather, until rela-
tively recently, the prevalent assumption (dating back to the original
Federalist debates) has been that "the perceived need for judicial ac-
countability to counterbalance life tenure, nonreducible salaries, and ju-
dicial review, began and ended with the impeachment mechanism."2  A
f Executive Director, Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, Univer-
sity of Denver. The Institute is a national, non-partisan organization dedicated to improving the
process and culture of the civil justice system. The Institute provides principled leadership, conducts
comprehensive and objective research, and develops innovative and practical solutions--all focused
on serving the individuals and organizations who rely on the system to clarify rights and resolve
disputes.
ft Director of Research, Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System,
University of Denver. The authors wish to thank the many judges, lawyers, and scholars whose
comments helped us develop the proposal contained in this article, with special thanks to Steve
Ehrlich and Russell Wheeler for their insightful comments on earlier drafts.
1. E.g., Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 864 (2002)
("Life tenure may be the most important ingredient in assuring federal judicial independence."); see
also, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection
Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 305 (2002); Daniel Klerman,
Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 455 (1999). But see Jonathan
Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2181 & n.35 (noting that life tenure and
the guarantee of no reduction in salary is "only one such template" for establishing judicial inde-
pendence).
2. Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial
Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 51 (1998); see also James E. Pfander, Re-
moving Federal Judges, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1231 (2007) (noting that Hamilton himself "ap-
pears to have embraced impeachment-and-removal exclusivity as a feature of both the New York
state constitution and the proposed federal Constitution ... [and] did not identify any alternative
judicial mode by which judges were to be removed from their offices."). But see Saikrishna Prakash
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1
reexamination of that assumption, however, has been sparked in the early
twenty-first century both by academic commentators and some in Con-
gress. The last ten years alone have produced a host of creative-
sometimes outrageous-alternatives to promote federal judicial account-
ability through (in most cases) a combination of executive and legislative
power and populist sentiment. Some such proposals are effectively sub-
stance-neutral, most notably replacing life tenure with fixed, lengthy
judicial terms.3 Other proposals, however, are aimed at the substance of
judicial decision-making, among them several schemes to strip federal
courts of jurisdiction to hear certain types of cases.4 Prominent politi-
cians have even occasionally threatened impeachment-or worse-for
federal judges as a punishment for decisions they did not find appropri-
ate.5 Contributing to the tenor of politically "accountable" judges is a
federal judicial appointment process that has become increasingly parti-
san in the last two decades.6
Populist-based accountability for judges is precisely what the Foun-
ders feared, and should be avoided.7 But this does not mean that judges
should be exempt from any form of accountability to the citizens they
serve. Rather, judges should remain accountable to the public for the
& Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 72 (2006) (arguing that the
Constitution permits Congress to "enact necessary and proper legislation permitting the removal of
federal judges upon a finding of misbehavior in the ordinary courts of law.").
3. See generally REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
(Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006); see also Steven G. Calabresi & James
Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 769 (2006); James E. DiTullio & John B. Schochet, Saving this Honorable Court: A Proposal
to Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen-Year Terms,
90 VA. L. REV. 1093 (2004).
4. See, e.g., Helen L. Norton, Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress's Latest Challenge
to Judicial Review, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1003 (2006); Caprice L. Roberts, Jurisdiction Strip-
ping in Three Acts-Three String Serenade, 51 VILL. L. REV. 593 (2006).
5. See, e.g., Mike Allen, DeLay Apologizes for Comments on Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 14,
2005 (page unavailable) (quoting House Majority Leader Tom DeLay's remarks that "the time will
come" for federal judges who refused to restore Terri Schiavo's feeding tube "to answer for their
behavior" and that the federal judiciary was "arrogant, out-of-control, [and] unaccountable."); Dana
Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A3 (noting
that several Congressional leaders had called for the impeachment of Justice Anthony Kennedy after
he authored an opinion forbidding capital punishment for juveniles); see also Editorial, Unimpeach-
able Sources-Impeaching Federal Judge Thornton Henderson, NAT. REV., Feb. 10, 1997 (suggest-
ing that Judge Henderson should be impeached specifically for his decision enjoining California
Proposition 209, which sought to prohibit racial preferences in certain programs).
6. See Steven B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch
Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909, 924-25 (2007) (arguing that "there is ample and persuasive evidence
from both Supreme Court and lower federal court appointment experience that presidential pursuit of
a policy agenda in making judicial nominations (and the reaction to it by Senators of the opposition
party) is the chief cause of the politicization of judicial selection at the federal level."). See also
NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE FEDERAL COURT
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 1-8 (2005).
7. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("The standard for good behavior for the continuance of office in the judicial magistracy is certainly
one of the most valuable of the modem improvements in the practice of government. In a monarchy
it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to
the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.").
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process of adjudication. Judicial decisions, whatever their substantive
impact, should be timely rendered, understandable, and supported by
clear legal reasoning. Parties and their attorneys should be treated fairly
and politely in the courtroom. And the judge should at all times earn the
public trust and reputation that naturally comes with his or her position.
These considerations locate accountability in actions that should be ex-
pected of any judge in any court, regardless of how the judge ascended to
the bench or the length of his or her tenure. Embracing accountability
for fair and efficient processes may help stave off irresponsible demands
for accountability for decisional outcomes.
Accountability based on process measures is not new. Process-
oriented criteria are employed regularly at the state court level to meas-
ure judicial performance, promote professional development among
judges, and educate the public on the importance of accountability for the
judicial process as opposed to the substance of specific decisions. At the
federal level, however, judicial performance evaluation (JPE) programs
remain an untried and (at least in a comprehensive form) unwelcome
resource. This need not be the case. The time is ripe to separate the no-
tions of judicial accountability for process and accountability for out-
come, and for the federal judiciary carefully to consider process-oriented
accountability through a regular performance evaluation program.
This Article begins with a discussion of the purpose and design of
JPE programs, gleaned from more than thirty years of experience at the
state level. Part II explores the sporadic history of federal JPE, and ex-
plains the historical objections to evaluation of federal judges. Part I
proposes a series of pilot studies to test different methods of implement-
ing JPE programs. Finally, Part IV discusses some of the more challeng-
ing issues presented by the establishment of a federal JPE program, and
offers topics for further reflection and research.
I. THE PURPOSE AND DESIGN OF JPE PROGRAMS
Judicial performance evaluation programs are currently in use in
various forms in nineteen states, as well as the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico.8 The details of these programs vary by jurisdiction, but all
are designed to meet three fundamental objectives: (1) to provide con-
structive feedback to sitting judges to inform their professional develop-
ment; (2) to educate the public on the work of its judges and foster ap-
propriate expectations about the role of the judge; and (3) where applica-
8. See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, SHARED
EXPECTATIONS: JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTEXT app. A (2006) [hereinafter SHARED
EXPECTATIONS].
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ble, to provide relevant information to decision-makers concerning the
retention or reappointment of judges.9
While there is no standard JPE program, most state programs share
similar characteristics. Judges are evaluated periodically, either at the
end of their terms or at another preset interval.10 Evaluations are typi-
cally conducted by an independent, volunteer commission composed of
attorneys, judges, and lay citizens.' 1 In many states, each branch of gov-
ernment appoints a certain number of members to the commission,
thereby reducing the risk of one appointing authority packing the com-
mission with his or her selections. 12 Commission members usually serve
staggered terms to further limit any potential mischief by any given ap-
pointing authority. 13
The commission must evaluate judges on predetermined criteria re-
lated to the process of adjudication rather than to substantive outcomes.
Most state JPE programs use the five criteria adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1985: legal knowledge, integrity and impartiality,
communication skills, judicial temperament, and administrative skills.'
4
Guided by these criteria, a present-day commission typically collects a
wide range of information on each judge, including surveys of those who
interact with the judge in the courtroom (always lawyers, and frequently
jurors, witnesses, litigants, or court staff as well), case management data,
interview data, information gleaned from direct courtroom observation,
and review of the clarity of the judge's written work product.' 5  The
commission reviews the collected information and composes a detailed
9. Judicial performance evaluation originated in the 1970s and 1980s as a method of provid-
ing process-oriented information on a judge's performance to voters in judicial retention elections.
It was subsequently adopted by a number of jurisdictions in which judges are subject to periodic
reappointment by the governor or state legislature, and even in Massachusetts and New Hampshire,
where state judges are appointed for life. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 211, § 26-26B (2005); MASS.
SUP. JUD. CT. R. 1:16 (2008); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 56 (2008).
10. In New Hampshire, for example, trial judges are appointed until retirement or age seventy,
and are nevertheless evaluated at least once every three years. See N.H. SUP. CT. R. 56(B)(A)
(2008).
11. The size of the evaluation commission varies considerably across jurisdictions, from the
seven-member Alaska Judicial Council to the thirty-member Arizona Commission on Judicial Per-
formance Review. See Alaska Judicial Council, Membership, http://www.ajc.state.ak.us (last visited
Oct. 17, 2008); Arizona Commission on Judicial Performance Review, http://www.azjudges.info
/home/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
12. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-102(l)(a)(l)(A) (2008) (dividing appointment au-
thority over the ten-member Colorado state performance commission between the Governor, Chief
Justice, President of the Senate and Speaker of the House).
13. See, e.g., S.B. 105, 2008 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2008) (establishing for Utah's new evaluation
commission that "At the time of appointment, the terms of commission members shall be staggered
so that approximately half the commission members' terms expire every two years.").
14. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE (1985)
[hereinafter 1985 ABA GUIDELINES]. The ABA reaffirmed these criteria in 2005. AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, BLACK LETrER GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
(2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/jd/lawyersconf/pdf/jpec-final.pdf.




report that discusses the judge's perceived strengths and weaknesses on
the bench. That report is given to the judge and, if appropriate, also pro-
vided to the judge's supervisor and those with the power to determine
whether the judge remains on the bench.' 6  Reports are also typically
made available to the public, either in full or summary form.'
7
JPE programs have an established track record at the state level.
They are sustainable over many years, even at high volume. In Colorado
alone, more than one hundred evaluations of trial and appellate judges
are typically conducted every two years, 8 and additional interim evalua-
tions have recently been introduced and formally codified as part of the
state's JPE statute.1 9 JPE also has positive ripple effects: judges have
found that JPE provides useful feedback for their professional growth-
information that they could not have otherwise received. 20 Furthermore,
at least one study has shown that the public has greater confidence in the
quality of its judges as a result of JPE programs.2' JPE also provides
critical information for judicial retention or reappointment decisions,
diluting the temptation of voters or reappointment authorities to make
such decisions on the basis of specific case outcomes.22
16. The retention/reappointment authority varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In many
states, retention of the judge is left directly to the voters, either in a special retention election in
which the judge runs uncontested and must pass a straight up-or-down vote, or in a contested elec-
tion. In other states, the legislature or governor bear the responsibility for reappointing judges. In
Hawaii and the District of Columbia, reappointment and retention decisions are conducted by a
commission. See D.C. Code § 1-204.33(c) (2008); HAWAI'I CONST. art. V1, § 3; Hawai'i State
Judiciary, Judicial Selection Commission, http://www.courts.state.hi.us/page-server/Courts/
2E049BDF320E2D7 1F0456B57B6.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
17. In New Hampshire and Hawaii, collective reports have been made available to the public
that review the judiciary as a whole. See JUDICIARY, STATE OF HAWAI'I, JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
PROGRAM 2007 REPORT (2007) (on file with authors), available at
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/attachment/218D 292A4F6A54DE9973AA6FC/JPP2007.PDF; Letter
from John T. Broderick, Jr., Chief Justice, to John Lynch, Governor, New Hampshire (Jul. 6, 2007)
(on file with authors), available at http://www.nh.gov/judiciary/PerEvalU2007-07-
03%20final%20report.pdf. But see Pamela A. Maclean, More States Evaluating Judicial Perform-
ance, NAT'L L.J. Jun. 2, 2008 (explaining that the New Hampshire Supreme Court will move to
individualized reports in 2008). In states with retention elections, full reports are frequently made
available on the commission's website, and summary reports are provided in voter guides. See
Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, Using Judicial Performance Evaluations to Promote
Judicial Accountability, 90 JUDICATURE 200, 204-05 (2007) (describing methods of public dissemi-
nation in each state).
18. Any Colorado judge who is eligible for retention is subject to a full evaluation during his
or her retention year. Historically, some judges have chosen not to stand for retention after the
evaluation has been completed, for reasons both related and unrelated to the evaluation results. Only
the evaluation results of those judges who choose to stand for retention are released to the public.
Accordingly, the number of judges who are evaluated is always somewhat higher than the number
whose evaluations are made publicly available.
19. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-106.3 (2008).
20. See infra nn. 142-144 and accompanying text.
21. A seminal 1998 study of JPE programs in four states found that significant majorities of
voters who received evaluation information agreed that "the official ... report adds to my confi-
dence in the quality of judicial candidates [seeking retention]." KEVIN M. ESTERLING & KATHLEEN
M. SAMPSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION EVALUATION PROGRAMS IN FOUR STATES: A REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS 41 (1998) (omission in original).
22. See id. at 39-40.
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The demonstrated benefits of JPE at the state level warrant serious
consideration of a similar program for the federal courts. It is true that
even the most successful state programs cannot be applied directly to the
federal judiciary, and that any federal JPE program would need to be
designed to address the unique circumstances of the federal courts. But
JPE does hold considerable promise for the federal system. Indeed, each
of the three major goals of state JPE translates meaningfully to the fed-
eral level. First, federal judges, no less than state judges, reasonably
could benefit from periodic feedback on their performance based on in-
formation gleaned from those who interact with them in the courtroom.
Although the Constitution intentionally shelters federal judges from pub-
lic sentiment to a greater extent than do most state systems, legitimate
expectations about a judge's ability to communicate clearly, treat parties
fairly, and manage cases effectively apply with equal force to federal and
state judges. Information derived from JPE programs might assist not
only individual judges, but also Chief Judges, court administrators, and
those who design and implement judicial education programs, to capital-
ize on individual and collective strengths, and address individual and
collective weaknesses.
Moreover, if widely disseminated to the public, thoughtful evalua-
tions at the federal level might help to educate the citizenry about its
judges. The evaluation process holds the power to be a valuable tool for
civic education; regardless of the outcome of any specific judicial
evaluation, the routine of evaluating all judges for the same process-
oriented skills reinforces to the lay citizen the proper expectations of a
good judge. Finally, JPE may prove to be an important asset for those
determining the reappointment of magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges,
and others not subject to Article 1's life tenure guarantees. Simply put,
JPE provides decision-makers with information that they would other-
wise not have at their disposal; given the choice between having or fore-
going relevant, high-quality information, responsible decision-makers
should choose to have the information every time.
I. FEDERAL JPE IN CONTEXT
A. The Historical Framework for Process-Oriented Accountability
Some of the principles underlying JPE have been present at the fed-
eral level for several decades, even though a sustained JPE program has
not. As described in this Part, however, efforts to expand these princi-
ples to develop a more comprehensive review of judges' process-
oriented performance have fallen short.
1. Nibbling at Accountability: Case Management and Misconduct
Both the federal courts and Congress have emphasized process-
oriented judicial accountability measures from time to time, usually in
the area of case management. The courts themselves took the lead. As
[Vol. 86:1
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Chief Justice, Earl Warren noted the negative impact of "[i]nterminable
and unjustifiable delays in our courts" on substantive rights,23 and pushed
the Judicial Conference of the United States to study, and eventually
recommend to Congress, the establishment of the Federal Judicial Center
24(FJC) as the research arm of the federal courts. Warren Burger, too,
bluntly acknowledged as Chief Justice that the federal judicial system
needed to explore and adopt better management techniques, and that
"[m]ore money and more judges alone is not the primary solution."
2 5
Certain judges at the district court level subsequently became active pro-
ponents of case management among their peers. 26 And in 1983, the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to give district judges
27greater management control over civil cases. With those amendments
came the increased expectation of judicial involvement in scheduling
events, controlling discovery, and promoting settlement. 28
Congress, however, was dissatisfied with the way it perceived some
judges to be using (or not using) their case management authority. In
1990 it passed the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA), which mandated
among other things that the Director of the Administrative Office of the
Courts prepare a semiannual report, available to the public, disclosing for
each judicial officer the number of motions pending more than six
months, the number of submitted bench trials pending more than six
months, and the number of cases pending more than three years. 29 The
CJRA thus created a degree of transparency and accountability regarding
the performance of federal judges. But the accountability it created was
at once too much and too little. Merely publicizing case processing data
about judges artificially elevates the importance of that data over other
process criteria. Moreover, information on a judge under the CJRA is
not available unless the judge fails to meet the statute's proscribed outer
time limits, and what information is available reflects a mere sliver of the
23. Maurice Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Remedies, in THE
COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 29, 31 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1965).
24. See Russell Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of Judicial Administration:
Creating the Federal Judicial Center, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 38-39 (1988).
25. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Remarks on the State of the Federal Judiciary (Aug. 10,
1970), in HOWARD JAMES, CRISIS IN THE COURTS iv (1971). Burger continued this plea throughout
his tenure as Chief Justice. See Warren E. Burger, Introduction to Symposium, Reducing the Costs
of Civil Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 217 (1985) (rejecting that additional judicial resources
would alone resolve the challenges faced by the federal courts, and arguing that "[j]udicial admini-
stration needs tireless, articulate workers.").
26. See, e.g., Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981).
27. The most prominent of the 1983 amendments were those to Rule II (mandating the impo-
sition of sanctions for abuses related to the signing of pleadings and motions), Rule 16 (requiring
case management conferences), and Rule 26 (giving the judge authority to keep discovery propor-
tional to the magnitude of the case). See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, 26 advisory committee's notes
(1983 amend.).
28. Id.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 476 (2008). Given the notion of transparency and accountability inherent in
the CJRA, it is ironic that the Director's semiannual reports are not available to the public on the
official U.S. Courts website.
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overall picture of a judge's performance with respect to case manage-
ment.
30
Congress's other foray into process accountability for judges oc-
curred in 1980, with the passage of the Judicial Conduct and Disability
Act. 3 1 That Act established a formal procedure for reviewing complaints
"alleging that a judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, or alleging
that such judge is unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason of
mental or physical disability., 32  The Act charged each chief circuit
judge with determining if complaints fell within the Act's coverage, and
dismissing those that did not.33 The Act also charged the Judicial Coun-
cils with investigating complaints that the chief judge did not dismiss,
and authorized the Councils to take a variety of actions, including impos-
ing a range of statutorily specific sanctions.34 The Act cautioned, how-
ever, that "[u]nder no circumstances may the judicial council order the
removal from office" of an Article III judge.35
Like the CJRA, the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act addresses
only very narrow issues of process-oriented accountability: those con-
cerning formal allegations of misconduct by a federal judge or a judge's
inability to discharge the duties of the office for health reasons. Most
federal judges never seriously come within its purview.36 The judge
whose written order is simply not clear, or whose courtroom manner is
abrasive, or whose dockets move at a snail's pace, will fly under the ra-
dar of the Act as long as no action rising to the level of formal miscon-
duct is alleged. And the judge whose written orders are careful and
thoughtful, and whose manner is unfailingly deserving of respect, will
similarly avoid acknowledgment.
30. Some statistical information on the performance of an entire court is available to the
public outside the auspices of the CJRA. The Federal Court Management Statistics on the U.S.
Courts website provide data on, among other things, each district court and circuit court's overall
caseload for the previous five years, actions per judgeships, and median times from filing to disposi-
tion and filing to trial for district courts. See generally http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/ (then
follow the District Court hyperlink for the year for which data is sought). The Federal Court Man-
agement Statistics, however, do not publicly disclose figures for individual judges.
33. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, P.L. 96-458,
94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (2006)).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 351(a).
33. Id. § 352.
34. Id. § 354(a)(l)-(2).
35. Id. § 354(3)(a).
36. A recent study found that roughly 650 to 800 complaints were filed annually between
2001 and 2005, with nearly half coming from prisoners. See JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABtLrrY
ACT STUDY COMMITTEE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF
1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 22 (2006). Almost all of the complaints were dismissed,
88% of the time because the allegations related directly to the merits of the case or were otherwise
frivolous. Id. at 6, 28.
[Vol. 86:1
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2. Limited Efforts at JPE Programs
Although process-oriented accountability has been addressed to
some degree in the areas of case management and judicial misconduct,
attempts to implement more comprehensive JPE at the federal level have
been sporadic and largely unsuccessful. For thirty years, most of the
discussion has centered on evaluating those federal administrative law
judges (ALJs) who serve pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.
In many ways, ALJs were a natural starting point for a federal judiciary
hesitant to embrace any form of external evaluation. Although they per-
form certain judicial functions, ALJs are employees of the executive
branch, and indeed are one of the few groups of career federal employees
that remain statutorily exempt from performance appraisals.37 Accord-
ingly, proposals to develop a JPE program for administrative law judges
have circumvented the thornier issue of Article III independence by
couching evaluations as promoting consistency among all executive
branch employees.38
Beginning in the late 1970s, several studies suggested that perform-
ance evaluations were necessary to assure consistency and efficiency in
administrative adjudication. In 1978, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) recommended that Congress amend the Administrative Procedure
Act to assign responsibility for periodic evaluations of ALJ performance,
to be conducted by the Civil Service Commission alone or in conjunction
with an ad hoc committee of lawyers, Chief ALJs, agency officials, fed-
eral judges, and the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS). 39 In 1978 and again in 1986, ACUS issued its own recommen-
dations for peer review.40 These recommendations emphasized the im-
portance of judicial independence, but also noted that "[m]aintaining the
administrative law judges' decisional independence does not preclude the
articulation of appropriate productivity norms or efforts to secure adher-
ence to previously enunciated standards and policies underlying the
[agency's] fulfillment of statutory duties.'
In 1992, ACUS issued Recommendation No. 92-7, which proposed
among other things that the Chief AU be permitted to coordinate devel-
opment of case processing guidelines for ALJs and conduct annual per-
37. See 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (2006) (exempting ALJs from the definition of "employee" for
the purpose of performance appraisals). See also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative
Judiciary: Establishing an Appropriate System of Performance Evaluations for ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 589, 590 (1993); 5 C.F.R. § 930.211 (2008).
38. See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 37, at 590-93.
39. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCESS: BETTER MANAGEMENT
Is NEEDED v-vi (1978).
40. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES RECOMMENDATION 78-2,
PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 36 (1978);
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES RECOMMENDATION 86-7, CASE
MANAGEMENT AS A TOOL FOR IMPROVING AGENCY ADJUDICATION 53 (1986).
41. ACUS RECOMMENDATION 78-2, supra note 40.
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formance reviews. 42 The recommendation also proposed a non-exclusive
list of criteria for ALU evaluation, including case processing guidelines
(i.e., ALl productivity and step-by-step goals), judicial comportment and
demeanor, and "the existence of a clear disregard of, or pattern of nonad-
herence to, properly articulated and disseminated rules, procedures,
precedents and other agency policy. '43  The recommendation spurred
considerable consternation and intense debate."a  The performance
evaluation program was never implemented, and ACUS itself lost Con-
gressional funding in 1995; one study suggests that ALJs angry with the
ACUS proposal were a contributing factor to its demise.45
A similar effort to create a performance evaluation program for fed-
eral immigration judges-who are Department of Justice employees-
was announced in August 2006.46 The directive from then-Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales described the need for a JPE program to detect
unusual reversal rates or backlogs, and emphasized that, in the words of a
Justice Department spokesman, "performance appraisals will not be used
to tell judges whether to grant or deny relief. ''47 The announcement nev-
ertheless was met with considerable skepticism by some immigration
judges, who voiced concern that the proposal would interfere with their
duty to administer their duties neutrally and without political pressure.48
Commentators, too, split on whether a performance evaluation program
for immigration judges could be constructed in a meaningful way.49 To
date, the program has not been implemented.
There have also been periodic efforts to introduce JPE into the judi-
cial branch. The Seventh Circuit Judicial Council, for example, has used
evaluations to screen sitting bankruptcy judges who are applying for re-
42. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
JUDICIARY RECOMMENDATION NO. 92-7, 89 (1992).
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 37, at 595-96; James P. Timony, Performance Evaluation of
Federal Administrative Law Judges, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 629 (1993); see also Ann Marshall
Young, Evaluation of Administrative Law Judges: Premises, Means, and Ends, 17 J. NAT'L ASS'N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 54-70 (1997) (proposing a different approach to ALJ evaluation).
45. Toni M. Fine, A Legislative Analysis of the Demise of the Administrative Conference of
the United States, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 19, 59-61, 96-97 (1998).
46. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines
Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals, Aug. 9, 2006, available at 2006
WL 2282541.
47. Nina Bernstein, Immigration Judges Facing Performance Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10.
2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/10/washington/10immig.html.
48. See id.
49. Compare Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the
Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 468, 469 (2007) (describing as an "especially bad
idea[]" "[p]erformance reviews that take into account and serve as a criterion for retention and
promotion") with Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Ddjb
Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 499 (2007) (noting that
the 1992 ACUS study "identified several criteria for a system of performance evaluation that appro-
priately protects decisional independence," including peer review and external oversight).
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appointment. 50 Such evaluations have consisted of surveys sent to a ran-
dom sample of one hundred attorneys who had at least two cases before a
given judge during the two years prior to evaluation. 51 The Eighth Cir-
cuit has used a similar program to evaluate magistrate judges and bank-
ruptcy judges in advance of reappointment decisions.52 And in 2003, the
Federal Judicial Center assisted the Judicial Conference's Bankruptcy
Committee in developing guidelines and surveys for evaluation of bank-
ruptcy judges, for the limited purpose of professional self-
improvement.53
To date, however, there have been only two notable efforts to ex-
tend JPE to federal district judges. The first was a voluntary program
developed in the Ninth Circuit in the early 1980s. The program emerged
in response to informal polls conducted by newspapers and bar associa-
tions within the Circuit to evaluate federal judicial performance; in the
words of the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
Ninth Circuit, a more comprehensive approach under the leadership of
the Judicial Conference would "contribute usefully to an effort to make
the evaluation of judges as constructive as possible and to avoid the dan-
gers of ill-conceived and sensational 'polls' which merely serve to influ-
ence passions. ' 54
As this language suggests, the Ninth Circuit project appears to have
been initiated and conducted from a strongly defensive posture. In au-
thorizing an Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Evaluation of Federal
Judges (the Ad Hoc Committee), the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council si-
multaneously authorized a parallel Committee to Study the Evaluation of
Lawyers.55 Furthermore, the Ad Hoc Committee was not authorized to
actually evaluate judges, but merely "to evaluate the evaluation of
judges. 56
The Ad Hoc Committee modeled its program on two previous pro-
grams in California. The first program used a bar committee to collect
attorney complaints about judges. The committee had no power to act on
the complaints, but rather passed the complaints along to a committee of
judges, who would forward them to the judge in question.57 This pro-
50. See DARLENE R. DAVIS, JUDICIAL EVALUATION PILOT PROJECT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 2 (1991).
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 11; see also Surveys on Behalf of the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois (on file with authors), available
at http://www.ilnb.uscourts.gov/Announcements/FJCSurvey.pdf.
54. Hon. James R. Browning, Evaluating Judicial Performance and Other Matters, 90 F.R.D.




57. See id. at 199.
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gram was severely limited: it had no transparency, no serious mechanism
for accountability other than the notion that "[p]eer pressure ... would
be a far more effective means of correcting judicial deficiencies, 58 and
no comprehensive scope. The second program considered by the Ad
Hoc Committee featured a questionnaire sent to attorneys who had ap-
peared before a district judge in the Northern District of California.59
Here again the lack of transparency was trumpeted as a virtue: "The ad-
vantages are clear .... The judge alone receives the responses. There is
no automatic public exposure to put the judge on the defensive and in-
hibit self-improvement.,
60
The Ninth Circuit Judicial Council ultimately adopted a voluntary,
confidential self-evaluation program for district judges in 1981.61 Few
judges participated. In fact, a 1985 Judicial Council survey found that
only nineteen of the 234 judges eligible for the program-less than 8%-
had actually undertaken self-evaluation.62
The second effort to evaluate federal district judges came in the
form of a pilot program completed in the Central District of Illinois in
1991, under the auspices of the Judicial Conference Committee of the
Judicial Branch.63 That district was selected in part because its district
judges unanimously expressed interest in the pilot. Indeed, interest was
so widespread throughout the district that the pilot program was ex-
panded to include magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges as well. 64
The pilot was limited in two key respects. First, the only source of
65evaluation information came from surveys sent to attorneys. The clerk
of the court reviewed a pool of attorneys who had appeared in civil and
criminal cases during the eighteen months prior to the study, and sent
surveys to a sample of 150 selected attorneys who had appeared before
each subject judge.66 Jurors, witnesses, and parties were specifically
excluded from the study.67 Second, the results were entirely confidential
and each completed survey was returned directly to the subject judge.68
The judges later estimated that the return rate on surveys was about fifty
percent.69
Despite (or perhaps because of) these limitations, the judges who
participated in the pilot project deemed it beneficial. One judge re-
58. Id.
59. See id. at 199-200.
60. Id. at 200.
61. See DAVIS, supra note 50, at 3.
62. Id. at 3-4.
63. Id. at 1.
64. See id. at 2.
65. See id. at 4.
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 8.
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marked, "The responses from the bar are an excellent barometer of how
we are perceived to be performing our duties., 70 Another judge stated
that the results of the survey are "helpful because they are about as ob-
jective an evaluation as we can hope to get.'
In the final analysis, however, the 1991 pilot study was at best a
mixed success. It demonstrated that JPE programs may benefit judges'
professional development by providing valuable information about each
judge's performance-information that the judge is unable or unlikely to
receive in any other format. At the same time, the pilot program clearly
failed on two fronts. Most obviously, despite positive reviews from the
participating judges,7 2 the program was neither repeated in the Central
District of Illinois nor attempted in other jurisdictions. Any momentum
toward the design of a more widespread evaluation program was there-
fore lost. In addition, even if the program had been repeated or expanded
in its original form, its extremely constricted scope rendered it of virtu-
ally no benefit to judicial training programs, court administrators, or the
public. Short of a formal report issued by the Federal Judicial Center the
following year,73 no information was disseminated about the results of
the program. Accordingly, the public neither learned about the perform-
ance of its individual judges nor was afforded the opportunity to see its
judges collectively as dedicated public servants striving for continuous
professional improvement. Even within the court, where collated survey
results might have helped develop new judicial education initiatives or
helped the Clerk's Office to anticipate case management issues, no such
information was forthcoming.
74
B. Conceptual Objections to Federal JPE
There are likely many reasons why JPE has not yet succeeded at the
federal level, but one key explanation may be anti-evaluation sentiment
within the courts themselves. Both conceptual and practical objections
have been offered by the courts. We discuss these objections below.
1. Decisional Independence
The most vocal objections to JPE focus on perceived abuses and
threats to the judiciary as an institutional actor. The most commonly
voiced objection is that JPE, by its very nature, constitutes an assault on
a judge's decisional independence.75 James Timony, an administrative




73. See generally id.
74. See generally id. at 4 ("[T]he subcommittee resolved that the results would remain strictly
confidential.").
75. See, e.g., Jacqueline R. Griffin, Judging the Judges, 21 LIGATION 5 (1995).
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JPE portion of the report "should be rejected, because it would diminish
the decisional independence of federal ALJs and would decrease public
acceptance of their decisions."7 6 Similarly, Denise Noonan Slavin, then-
President of the National Association of Immigration Judges, stated that
performance review of federal immigration judges was "unwelcome"
because it could lead to the public perception that rulings are based on
quotas rather than dispassionate application of the law.77 And Tennessee
Administrative Law Judge Ann Marshall Young has argued that "unless
sufficient attention is paid ... to the need to protect judicial independ-
ence on a practical and human basis, the costs of such oversight and
evaluation may outweigh any potential benefits. 78
Two studies have attempted to measure the perceived impact of JPE
on a judge's independence. A 2008 survey of Colorado judges con-
ducted by the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal Sys-
tem and Professor David Brody of Washington State University (the
"Colorado judges survey") revealed an almost perfect bell curve of judi-
cial opinion, with 28% of trial judges stating that the state's JPE program
decreases their judicial independence, 44% indicating no effect, and 29%
stating that JPE in fact increases their independence. 79 Another study of
judges in several states with JPE programs posed the question somewhat
differently, asking judges whether they agreed that "[tihe evaluation
process undermines my independence as a judge., 80 In that study, only
14.5% of judges in Colorado, 22% of judges in Alaska, and 33% of
judges in Arizona indicated their belief that their decisional independ-
ence was undermined by their state's JPE program.81
The survey findings provide reason for both optimism and concern.
On the one hand, they demonstrate that a substantial majority of judges
surveyed feel that JPE programs do not detract from (and indeed, may
increase) their decisional independence. On the other hand, the minority
of judges expressing concern about the impact of JPE on their independ-
ence cannot be disregarded.82 These figures suggest, at least to us, that
JPE programs should not be rejected for fear of conflict with decisional
independence, but instead should be developed thoughtfully and with
judicial input in order to minimize the risk of encroachment on the exer-
cise of independent judgment.
76. Timony, supra note 44, at 657.
77. Alfonso Chardy, Immigration Law: Respect Sought for Busy Judges, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 25, 2006, at B1.
78. Young, supra note 44, at 7-8.
79. INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, THE BENCH
SPEAKS ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: A SURVEY OF COLORADO JUDGES 31 (2008)
[hereinafter THE BENCH SPEAKS]. Nearly two thirds of all judges in the state, at both the trial and
appellate levels, responded to the anonymous survey. Id. at 2.





Judicial independence is a matter not only of the judge's internal
thought processes, but also of public perception. In this respect, JPE
programs can put instances of independent, albeit unpopular, judicial
decisions into context, thus strengthening judges' willingness to make
such decisions. The 2008 state evaluations in Colorado provide a con-
crete example. In October 2007, Judge James Klein, a district court
judge in the state's Twentieth Judicial District, issued a controversial
ruling granting a claim for adverse possession.83 Those who disagreed
with the ruling immediately branded it as a "land grab"; a term picked up
in the media.84 Soon Judge Klein was known to most of the public as the
"land grab" judge, to the extent he was known to the public at ally. His
regularly scheduled performance evaluation, however, properly de-
emphasized the single case outcome. The district commission reviewing
Judge Klein conducted a thorough evaluation of his overall performance,
issuing a report that emphasized his strengths, weaknesses, and opportu-
nities for continued development on the bench.86 The commission also
thoughtfully put the adverse possession case in the context of his overall
caseload and performance:
Judge Klein presided over a highly publicized adverse posses-
sion case. The Commission notes that this is only one of over
one thousand cases handled by Judge Klein over the past three
years. The Commission reviewed Judge Klein's rulings in the
case. Judge Klein listened to the testimony presented, visited
the site twice, and wrote clear and articulate rulings. Without
offering any opinion on the merits of the decision, or whether
the decision will be upheld by the appellate court, it is the opin-
ion of the Commission that Judge Klein followed appropriate
procedures. Disagreement with the result should not be ex-
pressed as unhappiness with Judge Klein's performance.87
Judge Klein was ultimately retained by the voters in the November
2008 election.88 No matter what the final result at the polls might have
been, however, the JPE program served its purpose of locating a single
case outcome in the broader context of the judge's overall role.
83. See McLean v. DK Trust, Case No. 06-CV-982, at I (Colo. 20th Jud. Dist. Oct. 17, 2007).
84. See, e.g., Heath Urie, Judge to Revisit 'Land-Grab' Case, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Apr.
2, 2008, at At; Editorial, Legal Land Grab Should be Overturned on Appeal, DENVER POST, Nov.
20, 2007.
85. See, e.g., Ryan Morgan, Judge in Land Case up for Retention, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA,
Apr. 3, 2008, at Al.
86. Judge Klein was appointed to the bench in 2005. See Commissions on Judicial Perform-
ance, Honorable James C. Klein (2008), http://www.cojudicialperformance.comretention.cfm?
ret=210 (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
87. Id.
88. Colorado District Judge Election Results, Denver Post,
http://data.denverpost.comlelectionlresults/district-judge/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
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Decisional independence is of course central to the role of the
judge. As one commentator has put it, independent decision-making
should "be viewed less as a power than as an indispensable responsibility
of all judges, at all levels .... ,89 Judicial performance evaluation may
help judges discharge that responsibility fairly and accurately, and can
educate the public on the full and proper role of the judiciary.
2. Life Tenure
Even leaving accountability issues aside, others object that JPE is a
needless exercise at the federal level because district and circuit judges
cannot be removed simply for underperforming. Judge Timony, for ex-
ample, has dismissed the notion that state JPE programs are useful mod-
els for a federal program, arguing that "[t]he evaluations of state judges
usually [are used] in retention elections, a process not relevant to federal
ALJs who serve for an unlimited term." 90 But this is all the more reason
to implement performance evaluations. Promises of continued employ-
ment are certainly no excuse for failing to perform to one's very best
ability. Baseball players with guaranteed contracts still work on their
swings. Best-selling authors have editors. Self-employed businesspeo-
pie send out customer satisfaction surveys. The position of federal
judges should be no different. They are appointed to the bench based on
a proven combination of skill, experience, and future promise; part of
fulfilling that promise is a commitment to the public to grow in the job.
Moreover, for federal judges who do not have life tenure, such as
magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges, JPE may assist not only with
professional development, but also with reappointment decisions. Full-
time federal magistrate judges serve eight-year terms; part-time magis-
trate judges four-year terms.91 Terms are renewable with the concur-
rence of the majority of district judges in a district court, or by the chief
judge if there is no such concurrence.92 Bankruptcy judges similarly
serve fixed terms of fourteen years, renewable by the Court of Appeals
for the circuit in which they serve.93 JPE is especially suited for these
judges, because it could provide critical information about the judge's
performance to the relevant decision makers in advance of a reappoint-
ment decision. We discuss one possible application of JPE to reap-
pointment decisions in Part ElI.
3. Public Perception
A final conceptual objection to JPE relates to the potential release of
evaluations into the public domain. The concern is that rather than fo-
89. Young, supra note 44, at 27.
90. Timony, supra note 44, at 641.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (2008).
92. See id. § 631 (a).
93. Id. § 152.
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cusing on the judges who receive excellent reviews, or even the judges
who demonstrate marked improvement in one or more areas, some in the
public sphere will emphasize the judge who does badly or who receives
particularly harsh comments.94 Where informal polls of attitudes toward
judges constitute the sole basis for judicial evaluation, there is indeed an
increased risk that judges will be inappropriately ranked, or that specific
evaluation results will be taken out of context.95 However, when evalua-
tions are based on a broad set of process-oriented criteria and are
grounded in credible information from a wide variety of sources, and the
process itself is transparent, the risk of media sensationalism or public
overreach has the potential to be greatly reduced.
There is in fact some evidence that when the judiciary publicly sup-
ports a JPE program and makes the results broadly available, it gains the
respect and confidence of the mass media-and perhaps by extension,
the public. After a bar-sponsored program released evaluations of trial
court judges in Pierce County, Washington, in June 2008, the county's
largest newspaper ran five different stories on the evaluations. None of
those articles focused exclusively on judges who did poorly (although
they did mention those judges whose overall evaluations were particu-
larly strong or weak),96 and several explicitly praised the judiciary for its
increased commitment to transparency and public service. As one edito-
rial put it, "Naturally, sitting judges don't much like getting report cards,
but Pierce County's judges cooperated admirably with the bar's rating
process. The bench wins more respect when it acknowledges that its
members should be held accountable for performance.,
97
Moreover, the Colorado judges' survey suggests that judges who
have been through a comprehensive JPE process at least once strongly
support providing evaluation results to the public. Nearly 69% of trial
judges indicated that they have no difficulty with Colorado's current
method of disseminating information to the public, which consists of
94. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 75, at 61-62 ("[A]ny [state] judge who is given a 'do not
retain' [recommendation] has no access to information on why or how the decision was made, and
he is unlikely to have the resources to mount a response .... ). This statement is incorrect. In most
comprehensive JPE states, each judge receives an extensive report compiling all the data on his or
her performance before the evaluation is even released to the public. Colorado allows judges who
disagree with a recommendation to seek a second interview with the evaluation commission, and, if
necessary, to write a short rebuttal statement to go to the voters prior to the evaluation's release. See
S.B. 08-54, 66th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2008) (codified as amended at COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-5.5-106(1)(a)(V) & -(2)(a)(V) (2008)). Arizona also enhances transparency by requiring
that the ultimate vote on whether the judge had met performance standards be taken publicly. See
ARIZ. COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE REVIEW IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA, 6(e)(3) (2006), available at
http://azjudges.info/about/procedure.cfm.
95. See Browning, supra note 54, at 199 (discussing a San Francisco Bar Association poll in
the late 1970s that led to rankings of individual judges in the press).
96. See, e.g., Editorial, Bar's Judicial Ratings Will Aid the Voters, NEWS-TRBUNE (Tacoma,
Wash.), June 3, 2008, available at http://www.thenewstribune.com/opinion/story/379136.html.
97. Id.
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posting full evaluations on the state commission website, and providing
short summaries of each evaluation in a voter guide.98 The judges who
provided comments in the survey uniformly indicated that public dis-
semination, and efforts to educate the public about the JPE process,
could in fact be even more extensive. 99 If judges who face retention
elections mere months after their evaluation favor such efforts to publi-
cize the results, federal judges with life tenure should be comfortable
with the release of their evaluations as well.
C. Practical Objections to Federal JPE
1. Cost
One frequently raised objection to JPE programs, even among those
who support evaluations in principle, is the cost associated with a regular
and ongoing JPE program. 1°° Surveys must be sent out and responses
tabulated. Where commissions are used, members may have to travel
and results must be disseminated. Particularly when taxpayer money is
at stake, the cost of a new program is never a matter to be taken lightly.
However, the cost of a JPE program for a federal district need not be
prohibitively expensive. The 1991 pilot program in the Central District
of Illinois reported very few costs, and concluded that "the cost of a simi-
lar evaluation program in a large district would most likely be mini-
mal."' ' While a full-scale, nationwide federal JPE program would cer-
tainly incur something more than "minimal" costs, evidence from exist-
ing programs suggests that it could be done in a cost-effective manner.
Detailed cost considerations usually begin with surveys. Some state
programs use private polling companies to design and circulate surveys
and tabulate responses, which ensures a high level of professional com-
petence in survey methodology. High quality polling can also be
achieved, however, through lower cost means. Some state programs
complete their polling through local universities, 1°2 which promises high
quality methodology with potentially less expense. Others have devel-
oped electronic surveys, 10 3 which eliminates mailing and copying costs,
and allows for results to be tabulated on a rolling basis. Existing com-
mercial survey software might well be suitable for use at least in federal
98. THE BENCH SPEAKS, supra note 79, at 26.
99. Id.
100. See generally Griffin, supra note 75, at 5-7.
101. DAVIS, supra note 50, at 7.
102. For example, Alaska conducts its JPE surveys through the University of Alaska Anchor-
age, Virginia uses Virginia Commonwealth University, and a recent pilot program in Pierce County,
Washington relied on surveys conducted through Washington State University.
103. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, for example, developed in-house an electronic
system to survey attorneys. Respondents complete surveys for individual judges on a secure, en-
crypted website, and results are automatically aggregated by judge. Mona Hochberg, Judicial Per-
formance Evaluation Coordinator, Mass. Supreme Judicial Court, Remarks at IAALS Symposium:




pilot programs. Costs associated with more robust JPE programs, such
as travel and public dissemination of results, can also be reduced or even
eliminated with modem communications technology-teleconferencing
and videoconferencing can reduce the number of required face-to-face
meetings for the commission, evaluation results can be posted on the
court's website at minimal cost,1°4 and so on. Reasonable options for
financing JPE programs can also be explored, perhaps through a modest
raise on application fees for admission to practice in a federal district
court.
Actually predicting costs is difficult, at least before thorough pilot
studies are undertaken. Data on the cost of JPE programs at the state
level are instructive but not dispositive. Massachusetts runs a relatively
limited program based on electronic surveys, with no evaluation com-
mission or publication of results, for the cost of one full-time employee
and some minor overhead costs. 10 5 Alaska evaluates anywhere from ten
to thirty judges each election cycle, spending $2000-4000 per judge for
surveys, travel, materials, and dissemination inclusive;' °6 if staff time
were to be factored in, the per judge cost would roughly double. 10 7 Vir-
ginia's JPE program currently spends about $5000 per judge for surveys,
but costs are expected to drop in the future to the range of $3500-4000
per judge. 10 8 These programs also benefit from economies of scale; the
more judges evaluated during a particular cycle, generally the lower the
per-j udge cost.t19
2. Risk of Politicization
Another common objection to JPE goes like this: "I support the idea
of evaluating judges, certainly for purposes of self-improvement, but if
we leave the evaluation to those outside the judiciary even the most care-
fully designed process is bound to inject politics into a system where
none should exist." 0 Judges alone, the argument goes, can be trusted to
understand the roles and responsibilities of the judiciary, and to reach
104. For excellent examples of state court websites describing their JPE programs and recent
results, see Alaska Judicial Council, http://www.ajc.state.ak.us (last visited Oct. 17, 2008); Arizona
Commission on Judicial Performance Review, http://www.azjudges.info (last visited Oct. 17, 2008);
Colorado Commissions on Judicial Performance, http://www.cojudicialperformance.com (last vis-
ited Oct. 17, 2008); Kansas Commission on Judicial Performance, http://www.kansasjudicialper-
formance.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2008); Supreme Court of New Mexico Judicial Performance
Evaluation Commission, http://www.nmjpec.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
105. See Hochberg, supra note 103.
106. Larry Cohn, Executive Dir., Alaska Judicial Council, Remarks at IAALS Symposium:
Judicial Performance Evaluation: Strategies for Success (Aug. 6, 2008) (notes from presentation on
file with authors).
107. Id.
108. Edward Macon, Assistant Executive Sec'y and Counsel, Supreme Court of Virginia,
Remarks at IAALS Symposium: Judicial Performance Evaluation: Strategies for Success (Aug. 6,
2008) (notes from presentation on file with authors).
109. Cohn, supra note 106.
110. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 75, at 7.
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conclusions about strengths and weaknesses in an objective and apoliti-
cal manner. Underlying this objection is the fear that various govern-
mental appointing authorities will choose commission members who will
evaluate judges on the basis of case outcome rather than adjudicative
process.' 1
Proponents of this view, however, are unable to cite to actual exam-
ples of politicized JPE programs. Instead, they argue by analogy. A
recent article by Justice Charles Wells of the Florida Supreme Court, for
example, argued that Florida was right to reject a comprehensive JPE
program because the state legislature had changed the statutory composi-
tion of its judicial nominating commission in a way that "increased the
potential for political influence in the selection of judges."'1 2 From this
starting point, Justice Wells extrapolated the conclusion that "there can
be no bulletproof guarantee that the judicial evaluation body will remain
free of legislative or executive influence."
' 1 3
It is certainly true that distrust between the courts and the legislative
branch is broad and deep.' 4 Recent concerns that proposed legislation
for an Inspector General for the federal judicial branch might result in
additional scrutiny of judges whose decisions are unpopular with Con-
gress, notwithstanding statutory admonitions to the contrary, has not
helped assuage this distrust.1 5 However, independent JPE commissions
should be seen as a possible solution to concerns over legislative or ex-
ecutive encroachment-not something to be discarded because of those
concerns. In over thirty years of operation, there are no clear-cut exam-
ples in the popular or scholarly literature of state JPE commissions
evaluating a judge on the basis of anything other than established, proc-
ess-oriented criteria. We are certainly not aware of any examples in
which a commission systematically targeted judges based on a particular
ideology or approach. Rather, the outward politicization of judges and
judicial decision-making occurs more frequently in jurisdictions that do
not have judicial performance evaluation programs. 16
The list of judges or entire judiciaries that have been targeted for
political reasons in jurisdictions lacking JPE programs is lengthy and
stretches out over more than two decades. At the state level, California
Chief Justice Rose Bird and two of her peers did not retain their seats on
111. See id.
112. Charles T. Wells, Editorial, Viewpoint: The Inherent Danger of Judicial Evaluation
Commissions, JACKSONVILLE DAILY RECoRD, Jan. 7, 2008, available at http://www.jaxdailyre-
cord.corn /showstory.php?Story id--49192.
113. Id.
114. For a discussion of a recent project to promote effective communication between Con-
gress and the courts, see Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, A Mechanism for Statutory
Housekeeping: Appellate Courts Working with Congress, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 131 (2007).
115. Russell R. Wheeler & Robert A. Katzmann, A Primer on Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO.
U. 1155, 1171 (2007).
116. See Kourlis & Singer, supra note 17, at 202.
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the state supreme court in 1986 after an extensive and politicized public
non-retention campaign. The three justices, who had no evaluations to
document their broader judicial performance (the California judiciary
had discussed but declined to adopt a JPE program in the early 1980s),"17
were left to defend themselves armed only with the esoteric notion of
"judicial independence"-which public polling showed "was the one
message that would not work."'" 8 In 1996, Justice David Lanphier of the
Nebraska Supreme Court and Justice Penny White of the Tennessee Su-
preme Court were separately removed from the bench in highly politi-
cized retention elections. 19 Once again, neither justice was able to point
to objective evaluations from an independent commission to defuse the
political rhetoric. Justice Lanphier limited his active campaigning to a
bare minimum in order "to maintain the dignity of the office," a strategy
that failed. 12 Justice White adopted Rose Bird's strategy of emphasizing
the importance of judicial independence, which unfortunately produced
the same result.'12  Justice White has since become an articulate sup-
porter of JPE programs as a bulwark against politicization and for judi-
cial independence, noting that "[u]ndoubtedly, much of the success of
those who seek to destroy judicial independence results from the lack of
available information upon which to base one's decision in judicial elec-
tions."'
122
To be clear, we are not asserting that JPE alone can inoculate the
judiciary against politicization efforts. Local and national political cul-
ture would seem to have the most powerful impact on the existence and
intensity of political attacks on the judiciary, and JPE by itself cannot
change a poisoned cultural dynamic. But if JPE is not a vaccine, it is
perhaps at least preventive medicine. Efforts to hold judges "account-
able" for particular case outcomes appear more likely to find purchase in
jurisdictions where process-oriented accountability measures are not
publicly available. The "JAWL 4 Judges" initiative 123 emerged in South
117. See REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS & JORDAN M. SINGER, A FRESH LOOK AT JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN CALIFORNIA 4-5 (2007), available at
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/news/CA%20JPE.html.
118. John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign,
The Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348, 350 (1987); see also
Bill Zimmerman, The Campaign that Couldn't Win: When Rose Bird Ran Her Own Defeat, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1986, at VI (noting that "[to base a political campaign on the independence of the
judiciary was to commit electoral suicide").
119. See Traceil V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons from the Defeat of
Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 76-77 (1999).
120. Id. at 72.
121. See id.
122. Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of Judicial
Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1076 (2002).
123. The proposed initiative, styled as Constitutional Amendment E, would have allowed a
thirteen-member "Special Grand Jury" to expose judges and prosecutors, as well as citizens serving
on juries, school boards, county commissions, or in similar decision-making capacities to fines and
jail-and strip them of public insurance coverage and up to half their retirement benefits-for mak-
ing decisions that break rules defined by the special grand jurors. See CHRIS NELSON & KEA
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Dakota, a state without a JPE program, in 2006. When that effort proved
unsuccessful, 124 proponents proceeded with efforts to get the same meas-
ure on the ballot in Florida (a state that recently rejected any public dis-
semination of its JPE results) 125 in 2008.126 Increased attacks on the state
judiciary have also occurred recently in Missouri, 127 which similarly has
lacked a formal JPE program.12 8 Once again, we do not wish to suggest
that the mere absence of a formal JPE program caused these attacks;
rather, it is sufficient to observe that more existential threats to the inde-
pendence of the judiciary tend to arise in states where public accountabil-
ity through a JPE process is wanting.
By contrast, judges in JPE jurisdictions tend to be less subject to
specialized attacks. When these attacks do occur, evaluation results-or
simply the existence of a JPE program-have been used to emphasize
the judges' adjudicative skills and depoliticize special interest messages.
In 2006, for example, a ballot initiative was introduced in Colorado
which sought to term-limit all of the state's appellate judges. 129 The ini-
tiative was retroactive and would have immediately removed nineteen of
the state's twenty-six appellate judges from the bench, regardless of their
experience and abilities. A spirited public education campaign, empha-
sizing among other things the fact that Colorado already had a system for
evaluating (and, if necessary, removing) judges in a much more precise
fashion, helped to defeat the initiative at the polls. 130  A follow-up study
of Colorado voters found that only 18% of those who voted for judicial
WARNE, SOUTH DAKOTA 2006 BALLOT QUESTIONS (on file with authors), available at
http://www.sdsos.gov/electionsvoteregistration/electvoterpdfs/2006SouthDakotaBallotQuestion-
Pamphlet.pdf. The proposed amendment was designed to apply retroactively. Id.
124. Due in large part to an extensive public campaign, the proposal was ultimately defeated
by a 9-1 margin. See SOUTH DAKOTA SECRETARY OF STATE, GENERAL ELECTION OFFICIAL
RETURNS FOR BALLOT QUESTIONS (on file with authors), http://www.sdsos.gov/elections
voteregistration/pastelections electioninfo06_- GEballotquestions.shtm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
125. See Letter from Peter D. Webster, Chair, Comm. on Judicial Evaluations, to R. Fred
Lewis, Chief Justice, Fla. Sup. Ct. (July 10, 2007) (on file with authors).
126. See Florida Department of State, Division of Elections, Initiative No. 02-06 (2002), avail-
able at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initdetaI.asp?account=35025&seqnum=1.
127. As one example, Missouri Governor Matt Blunt used part of his 2008 State of the State
Address to encourage the state legislature to "close the door" on courts who have "hijack[ed] the
powers to tax and spend," even though no Missouri state court had raised such an issue in an opin-
ion. Governor Matt Blunt, 2008 State of the State Address (Jan. 15, 2008) (on file with authors),
available at http://governor.mo.gov/State of the State_2008.pdf. Missouri is now the center of a
firestorm concerning the best form of state judicial selection, and legislative threats to discontinue
the Missouri Plan-the first state merit selection system implemented in the country-continue.
128. On February 29, 2008, the Supreme Court of Missouri created JPE committees at the trial
and appellate levels by court rule, pursuant to its constitutional authority. The basis for the rule was
a Report of the Missouri Judicial Evaluation Survey Committee. The program went into effect
almost immediately, with the first set of reports and recommendations scheduled to be released in
September 2008. See Letter from Dale C. Doerhoff, State Chair, Missouri Judicial Performance
Evaluation Comms., to Participants at ]AALS Symposium: Judicial Performance Evaluation: Strate-
gies for Success (Aug. 5, 2008) (on file with authors).
129. See STATE OF COLORADO, ANALYSIS OF THE 2006 BALLOT PROPOSALS 7-8 (2006).
130. The proposed initiative gained only 43% support in the November 2006 election. See
STATE OF COLORADO, OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABSTRACT OF VOTES CAST FOR THE 2005
COORDINATED, 2006 PRIMARY, 2006 GENERAL 140 (2006).
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term limits were aware that judges were evaluated by an independent
commission; by contrast, 41% of those who voted against term limits
knew specifically about the state's JPE commissions. 131 Far from inject-
ing politics into the evaluation process, independent JPE programs-
when they are publicly known and understood-have a tendency to serve
as a bulwark against political attacks on the judiciary, making such pro-
posals less likely to pass public muster.
III. DEVELOPING A MODEL FOR FEDERAL JPE THROUGH PILOT
PROGRAMS
In this Part, we propose a series of different pilot studies to test the
benefits of JPE at the federal level. We suggest several alternatives: (1) a
pilot program designed to elicit confidential feedback for federal district,
magistrate, and bankruptcy judges strictly to promote professional self-
improvement; 132 (2) a pilot designed to collect information on magistrate
judges to provide feedback during their terms and provide information to
the relevant decision-makers when the magistrate judge seeks reap-
pointment; and (3) a program that employs an independent commission
to review a wide range of data on the performance of district, magistrate,
and bankruptcy judges, and to distill that information into a written re-
port describing each judge's strengths and weaknesses on the bench.
These proposed pilots are described in more detail below, although the
opportunity for variation extends far beyond those three. Upon comple-
tion, we envision that each of the pilot studies would themselves be
evaluated to determine their value in providing useful feedback to
judges, increasing transparency and process accountability in an appro-
priate manner, and promoting greater public understanding of the courts.
Pilot programs should be designed to test the application of differ-
ent elements of state JPE programs to the federal arena. These elements
include the types of information collected, how the information is col-
lected, whether the information is provided directly to the judge or re-
viewed first by a supervisor or commission, whether specific recommen-
dations concerning the judge's professional strengths and weaknesses are
made, to whom evaluation results will be provided, and the specific goals
of the program. We recognize that the ideal pilot studies would be con-
trolled experiments; however, given the reality of the federal courts'
131. See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LEAGUE OF
WOMEN VOTERS OF COLORADO, 2007 COLORADO VOTER OPINIONS ON THE JUDICIARY 4 (2007),
available at http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/form-voter-input.html.
132. In restricting these pilot proposals to the district court level, we do not mean to suggest
that other federal judges, such as appellate judges and ALIs, should themselves have no formal
evaluation. Indeed, at the state level appellate judges have been evaluated for decades, and thought-
ful programs have been developed to tailor appellate evaluations to the specific tasks and responsi-
bilities of those on the appellate bench. New programs for appellate judges are being considered as
well. Among them, the State of New Hampshire recently established an internal committee respon-
sible for developing individualized performance evaluations of its Supreme Court. See Maclean,
supra note 19.
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dockets and the concern about installing an untried JPE program at the
federal level, much less rigorous approaches will have to suffice. 133
The three pilot studies described below build one on the other. The
first proposed pilot is designed primarily to test the development of sur-
veys, collection of meaningful case management data, and judicial re-
sponse to receiving anonymous feedback. The second pilot includes
each of these features, and additionally examines the value of interviews,
independent review of judicial orders for clarity of communication, and
distribution of evaluation results to those specifically charged with reap-
pointing federal magistrate judges. The third proposed pilot would test
the perceived advantages and disadvantages of an independent evaluation
commission, and further would examine the efficacy of direct courtroom
observation and judicial self-evaluations. While there is a logical pro-
gression to these proposals, they are not the only possibilities, and we
welcome further discussion of the precise development of such pilots.
A. Pilot Proposal Number One: Confidential Evaluations
As the 1991 study in the Central District of Illinois suggested, a ba-
sic JPE pilot could be organized and conducted solely within the judicial
branch at relatively low cost. Like the Central District of Illinois pilot,
our first proposed program would preferably be piloted in a district in
which all judges support the endeavor. Also like the Illinois pilot, the
program would be based primarily on survey responses from those who
have directly interacted with the judge in the courtroom. We would go
beyond just attorneys who have appeared before the judge, however, and
also issue surveys to litigants, court staff, and jurors where appropriate.
For purposes of the pilot program, it may make sense to have these sur-
veys developed by the Federal Judicial Center.
Survey data traditionally have formed the backbone of judicial per-
formance evaluations, and some background on their use is warranted.
Attorney surveys in particular already comprise the core of JPE programs
at the state level. In addition, the Chicago Council of Lawyers has con-
ducted survey-based evaluations of federal judges who sit in Chicago for
over thirty-five years, including evaluations of magistrate judges, district
judges, senior district judges-and judges on the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. 134 The most recent survey-seeking input on Chicago-area
federal magistrate judges-was sent to approximately 3,400 members of
the Federal Trial Bar for the Northern District of Illinois, as well as all
members of the United States Attorney's Office and Federal Defender's
133. For a discussion of the benefits of controlled experimentation in the context of procedural
rules, see Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of Procedure-Impact Studies in the Administration of
Justice, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 14-16 (1988).




Office in Chicago. 135 Survey recipients were asked about the magistrate
judge's integrity (for example, by indicating their level of agreement
with the statement "His/her rulings in civil cases are free from any pre-
disposition to decide for either plaintiff or defendant"), judicial tem-
perament (e.g., "He/she is courteous toward lawyers and litigants"), legal
ability (e.g., "He/she understands the issues in complex cases"), deci-
siveness (e.g., "He/she rules promptly on pretrial civil motions"), 36 and
diligence (e.g., "His/her hearings and pretrial conferences reflect ade-
quate research and preparation").
37
As the Chicago surveys suggest, attorney surveys must be carefully
tailored both in their design and in their dissemination. 138 The survey
should contain questions designed to elicit attorneys' perceptions of the
judge's level of preparedness, clarity of expression, impartiality, and
temperament on the bench, but should never allow them to comment on
the substantive merits of a decision or order. With respect to dissemina-
tion, care must be taken to target only those attorneys who have actually
appeared before the judge during the evaluation period, and to require
those attorneys to respond to the survey based only on their personal
experience with the judge. 139 In addition, an emerging practice at the
state level is to survey attorneys shortly after the close of each case rather
than to survey all attorneys at the same time. 140 Continuous dissemina-
tion of surveys has the virtue of targeting respondents while their experi-
ence with the judge is fresh in their minds.
Surveys should also invite attorneys to provide more extensive
comments on the judge. In the pilot program in the Central District of
Illinois, several of the judges who participated in the program reflected
that the surveys and comments were beneficial to their professional de-
velopment going forward. One district judge explained:
I have benefited from knowing the feelings, ratings, and views of
the attorneys. We all develop habits or ways of doing, or not do-
ing, things in connection with our offices that we often are
135. Id. at 2.
136. Id.
137. Id. at Exhibit 2.
138. See Steven Flanders, Evaluating Judges: How Should the Bar Do It?, 61 JUDICATURE
304, 304-05 (1978) (praising the efforts of the Chicago Council of Lawyers but cautioning that bar
polls alone may not produce a fully accurate picture of the judiciary).
139. The State of Alaska actually permits attorneys to complete surveys based on professional
reputation or social contacts with the judge, but they must clearly indicate that this is the basis for
their answers, and the basis for such responses is noted in the judge's final evaluation. See
UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH RESEARCH AND SERVICES, ALASKA
JUDICIAL COUNCIL RETENTION SURVEY 1 (2004). No other jurisdiction permits evaluations based
on anything other than direct experience.
140. See, e.g., COLO. RULES GOVERNING COMM'NS ON JUD. PERF. 10(a) (2007) (requiring that
"surveys shall be conducted on a continuing basis").
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oblivious to that need continuing or changing. The responses I
got will aid me in doing my job.
141
Similarly, the Colorado judges survey indicated that most judges
appreciated the greater feedback and were able to translate that feedback
into immediate positive change.142 As one judge put it:
The most useful part of the process is the survey results. Al-
though I think we're never as good as the most glowing compli-
ments and never as bad as the worst, it is sometimes possible to
find a common thread that alerts you to deficiencies. Even the
most hateful comments may contain a kernel of truth.
143
Attorney surveys are a necessary component of judicial evaluations,
but other groups may also offer valuable information. Whereas attorney
surveys in most jurisdictions ask for the attorney to rate a judge on a slid-
ing scale for each question, juror surveys tend to ask a limited number of
straightforward yes or no questions. This approach has the dual advan-
tage of being easy to understand (yes or no questions make difficulties in
the interpretation of questions less likely) and easy to complete (making
it more likely that jurors will give it due attention after a long trial). As
with attorney surveys, juror questionnaires tend to focus on the judge's
behavior and control in the courtroom, rather than any substantive matter
in the case. To this end, juror surveys might include questions such as:
Did the judge treat people with courtesy? Did the judge act with pa-
tience and self-control? Did the judge act with humility and avoid arro-
gance? Did the judge pay attention to the proceedings throughout? Did
the judge clearly explain the responsibility of the jury? Did the judge
start court on time? And did the judge maintain control over the court-
room?1"
In practice, juror surveys tend to be overwhelmingly positive for
judges. 145 This is clearly a good thing from the perspective of juror ser-
vice and public perception of the courts. Jurors who leave a courtroom
believing that the judge acted thoughtfully, fairly, compassionately
(where appropriate), and with a firm hand are more likely to think about
the courts as a steady and valued institution, and are also more likely to
share their positive experience with others. As one commentator has put
it, "The [jury] system has served many purposes, but its enduring pur-
pose has been to secure a greater measure of trust in judicial institu-
141. DAVIS, supra note 50, at 9.
142. THE BENCH SPEAKS, supra note 79, at 13.
143. Id. at 14.
144. For related model juror questions, see SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 8, at Appendix
F.
145. See, e.g., STATE OF UTAH, UTAH VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET-GENERAL ELECTION
NOVEMBER 2, 2004 at 46-69 (2004) (showing that jurors gave favorable responses of 95% or higher
to virtually all survey questions for virtually all district judges evaluated in 2004).
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tions." 146 Because these virtues are so important, one should resist any
temptation to discount high across-the-board ratings in juror surveys.
Indeed, cause for concern should stem not from high ratings, but from
abnormally low ones. The judge who does not connect with the jury, and
who does not win jurors' confidence or respect, fails in at least that as-
pect of his or her role as a public servant.
Litigants might also be surveyed, preferably shortly after the close
of the case. The existing literature suggests that litigants' satisfaction
with the litigation process is far more relevant to their ultimate percep-
tion of the courts than the final outcome. Based on a review of court user
studies in the 1980s, New York University Professor Tom Tyler con-
cluded that "[t]he important role of procedural justice in mediating the
political effects of experience means that fair procedures can act as a
cushion of support when authorities are delivering unfavorable out-
comes." 147 The existence of litigant surveys also serves as a gentle re-
minder to judges that the perception of procedural fairness is as essential
to the courtroom experience as the reality. As one judge put it, courts
must be known for "fairness and respect, attention to human equality, a
focus on careful listening, and a demand that people leave our courts
understanding our orders."
148
Nevertheless, because individual litigants tend to have the highest
emotional investment in a case, surveys should be crafted with particular
care to focus only on general aspects of the litigation process. Appropri-
ate questions for litigant surveys may include: was the judge well-
prepared for your case? Was the judge respectful to you? Were the
judge's rulings clear? Did the judge explain his or her ruling in a way
that you could understand? And did the judge listen to your side of the
case?
149
Self-represented litigants present an additional challenge, because
they lack the mediating force of an attorney to help explain procedures
and decipher rulings. And while family law matters-almost exclusively
the province of the state court system-tend to see unrepresented liti-
gants in particularly high numbers, 150 the growing costs of legal services
means that federal courts are not immune from increasing numbers of
pro se litigants. Indeed, over twenty thousand cases were filed by non-
146. Paul D. Carrington, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 79,93 (2003).
147. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 107 (1990).
148. Kevin S. Burke, A Court and a Judiciary that Is as Good as Its Promise, 40 CT. REV. 4, 6
(2003).
149. See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 8, app. G.
150. In Colorado, nearly 56% of litigants in domestic relations cases were self-represented in
1999, and the percentage was growing. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM,
FINAL REPORT 35 (2000) (on file with authors), available at http:llwww.state.co.us/cjrtf
/report/report.htm (last viewed Aug. 3, 2008).
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prisoner pro se litigants in the federal courts in 2007.151 This does not
mean, however, that pro se litigants require a different set of questions
from those who do have legal representation. The survey instrument
should include a question as to whether the respondent was self-
represented, so that any trends concerning the judge's treatment of pro se
litigants can be acknowledged.
Finally, surveys might be developed for court staff: law clerks, ad-
ministrative staff, division clerks, court reporters, and others who interact
with the judge on a regular basis in the courtroom. Such surveys should
focus on the judge's interactions with support staff and clerks, level of
preparedness in the courtroom, and responsiveness to administrative
concerns, including case management issues.
For each of the respondent categories described above, care should
be taken to ensure the anonymity of the respondents. Nothing on the
survey should require or otherwise encourage the respondent to identify
him or herself by name or specifics of the case. Where comments are
provided, anonymity can be more thoroughly protected by asking some-
one unaffiliated with the judge being evaluated to review the comments
and remove any identifying information before such comments are for-
warded to the judge.
The number of responses to each survey is also important. 152 Juror
response rates can be kept high by requesting (or even requiring) that
each juror complete the short survey at the end of trial as the final com-
ponent of jury service. Attorney response rates, which are traditionally
low, can be raised to adequate levels in two ways. First, the surveys
might be sent out on a rolling basis, shortly after the termination of each
case, 153 so that the specifics of the case and the judge's performance are
fresh in the attorney's mind. Second, wherever possible, surveys should
be sent out electronically. Recent developments in electronic survey
software provide respondents with the same guarantees of anonymity,
allow for surveys that can be completed quickly with a few mouse clicks,
and make it easy for the survey provider to track the number of surveys
sent out and returned. 154 Furthermore, the federal district courts' move to
electronic filing in recent years means that virtually every attorney of
151. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, tbl. S-23 (2007).
152. See LAWRENCE F. LOCKE ET AL., READING AND UNDERSTANDING RESEARCH 48 (1998)
(explaining the importance of an adequate sample size).
153. Here we define "termination" to mean the formal closing of the case, notwithstanding the
possibility of appeal or reopening under other circumstances. Cases that close before an answer or
other responsive pleading is filed would not be included.
154. See Gabriel M. Gelb & Betsy D. Gelb, Internet Surveys for Trademark Litigation: Ready
or Not, Here They Come, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1073, 1076-79 (2007) (describing the growth and
development of online surveys); Dwight B. King, Jr., User Surveys: Libraries Ask, "Hey, How Am I
Doing?", 97 LAW LIBR. J. 103, 109-112 (2005) (same).
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record has a valid e-mail account on file with the court, making accurate
outreach to attorneys a relatively simple matter.
1 55
Response rate and anonymity are more significant challenges for
litigant surveys, although those challenges are not insurmountable. Most
litigants (other than those proceeding pro se) do not automatically pro-
vide a physical or e-mail address to the court. Litigants may also feel
less of an obligation to complete the survey than attorneys or jurors.
Response rates can be increased, however, by making the opportunity to
provide feedback easily available. The use of comment cards in restau-
rants provides an analogy. As one recent study concluded:
If a customer has to seek out a comment card from a host or
hostess, the cashier, or the front desk, suggestions for improve-
ment of operations and general customer feedback on service are
likely not to be received. Instead, relatively infrequent com-
ments relating to extreme situations will likely be the only feed-
back provided. Although useful to know about these situations,
it is of much greater importance to continually have the typical
customer's assessment of normal operating conditions. 1
56
One method of creating a larger and more representative response
rate is to make it easy for each litigant to provide information by provid-
ing the litigant with information at the end of the case that identifies a
court website and gives a specific (and time-limited) password to log into
the system. The respondent could use any computer to complete the
survey. Another possibility is to develop kiosks in the courthouse that
would allow litigants to complete evaluation surveys electronically after
leaving the courtroom. Of course, survey questions would have to be
carefully formulated to protect against responses based on the emotion of
an immediate courtroom appearance. But the technology for such kiosks
already exists, and is being put to use in several state courthouses.
1 57
Beyond survey data, we propose that the first pilot include collec-
tion of individual judges' case management data. Such data could be
compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and sent to the
judge to introduce an additional perspective on the judge's overall per-
155. E-mail has become so essential to electronic case filing that one recent decision suggests
that an attorney's failure to check the status of a case via e-mail or the PACER system may consti-
tute professional malpractice. See Jessica Belskis, Electronic Case Filing: Is Failure to Check
Related to an Electronically Filed Case Malpractice?, 2 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 13, 13 (2005)
(discussing Blackburn v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. & Forest Serv., No. C04-1404RSM (W.D. Wash.
2005)).
156. Joel D. Wisner & William J. Comey, An Empirical Study of Customer Comment Card
Quality and Design Characteristics, 101 BRITISH FOOD J. 621, 629 (1999).
157. See Randall T. Shepard, The New Role of State Supreme Courts as Engines of Court
Reform, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1535, 1546 (2006) (discussing the emergence of "pro se kiosks" in
Maricopa County, Arizona); Henri E. Cauvin, New Internet Kiosks Make Courts More User-
Friendly, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2007, at DZ03 (noting installation of kiosks in the D.C. Superior
Court to provide information and allow payment of fines).
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formance. In addition to data concerning closed cases, average time to
disposition, average caseload, and the like, at the pilot court's election,
the data might also indicate to each judge where his or her statistics rank
within the district, the circuit, and the nation. We float this idea not be-
cause we believe that judges should be ranked crudely against each other,
but rather because relative performance, particularly within a district
where judges have comparable dockets, is another important piece of
information.
Judges in the 2008 Colorado survey expressed overwhelming sup-
port for the inclusion of case management data in performance evalua-
tions. Overall, 73% of trial judges surveyed agreed or strongly agreed
with the statement that case management data should be part of the
evaluation process. 158 The judges in the survey expressed caution that
such data be considered carefully and thoughtfully, and that judges be
given the opportunity to explain to the committee any unusual issues
with their dockets.159 A federal JPE pilot might strike the same balance
in the use of case management data; such data could be reviewed care-
fully for each judge and afforded appropriate, but not undue, weight in
light of all the other factors comprising the judge's performance.
As envisioned in this pilot program, formal "evaluations" would not
exist in a concrete sense. Rather, the survey and case management data,
and relevant survey comments, would be sent to each judge for review
and consideration toward his or her professional self-improvement. A
slightly more robust version of this pilot would use the survey and case
management results for individual mentoring or collective judicial train-
ing sessions.
At the completion of the pilot program, a separate study should be
conducted to determine whether (and to what extent) the program met its
stated goals, and which aspects of the program are worth maintaining,
developing further, or discarding. This study could be conducted by the
FJC or an organization unaffiliated with the federal judiciary that has
similar capacity to conduct high-quality analysis. 160 Any such study
should seek to measure all data reasonably related to the pilot program's
goals. Here, the goals would include developing useful and appropriate
survey instruments, soliciting an adequate number of survey responses,
and providing meaningful information to judges in the form of survey
and case management data. Much of the data that can be collected is
158. THE BENCH SPEAKS, supra note 79, at 14.
159. See id. at 15-19.
160. Assuming adequate resources are available, the benefits to using the FJC are rather obvi-
ous. The FJC's knowledge of the federal courts and the circumstances under which they operate
makes it a natural first choice. At the same time, however, using a competent organization outside
the judiciary to review the effectiveness of the pilot projects would remove any charge that the




objective: how many judges were evaluated? Did all judges participate
voluntarily? How frequently did evaluations take place? What criteria
were set for evaluation? Other effectiveness data are subjective but
highly important: did the judges find the feedback they received to be
useful? Did judges express any concerns about the impact of the pro-
gram on their decisional independence? Did the process generate any
evidence of increased confidence among the bar or the public or both?
We recognize that the most important goal, improved judicial per-
formance, would be difficult to measure meaningfully in the context of a
pilot program. Careful selection of measurement variables, however,
may help approximate at least the perceptions of improved performance.
This approximation can be further strengthened by the inclusion of addi-
tional structural and data elements in the pilot program. We turn next to
an example of this type of more robust pilot-one that adds interviews,
review of written orders, and supervisory feedback.
B. Pilot Proposal Number Two: Magistrate Evaluations
A second proposed pilot program would be limited to the evaluation
of magistrate judges, but would be expanded with respect to the amount
of information collected and the purposes for which such information
was used. Specifically, the program would be designed to provide con-
structive feedback to magistrate judges well before the time they would
need to announce intent to seek reappointment, and also to provide the
historical evaluations of each magistrate judge to those vested with the
responsibility of making reappointment decisions.
The value of comprehensive evaluations to the reappointment proc-
ess is a primary goal of this proposed pilot. Currently, the information
available for reappointment recommendations is relatively limited. As-
suming the district court decides to consider an incumbent for reap-
pointment, an independent panel is created to collect information and
recommend whether the magistrate judge should be awarded an addi-
tional term. 161 The panel typically seeks input on the magistrate's per-
formance through public comments, although an interview with the in-
cumbent is also encouraged. 62 But as Professor Resnik has documented
in the context of bankruptcy judge reappointments, giving heavy weight
to public comments poses considerable risk. Comments come from self-
161. At least one year before the expiration of the magistrate judge's term, the district court
must inform the magistrate judge whether it has determined not to reappoint the magistrate judge, or
whether it has determined to consider reappointing the magistrate judge. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, THE SELECTION, APPOINTMENT, AND REAPPOINTMENT OF UNITED
STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES 29 (2002). If the district court chooses the latter route, it must issue a
public notice soliciting volunteers to serve on a "merit selection panel" for reappointment. Id. at 30.
The panel must include at least two lawyers and at least two non-lawyers. Id. at 12.
162. Id. at 30.
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selected respondents who may have particular agendas. 163 Furthermore,
lawyers whose critical comments would otherwise be valuable may be
reluctant to comment for fear that, should the judge be reappointed not-
withstanding their feedback, they may have to appear before the judge
with their identities-and criticisms-known. 64  The proposed pilot
would test whether these concerns could be alleviated by broadly ex-
panding the pool of information available to the reappointment panel, as
well as employing anonymous surveys administered under the same rig-
orous methodology as proposed in the first pilot program.
As with the first pilot program described above, the magistrate pilot
would begin with the collection of survey data and relevant case man-
agement data. In addition, the developers of the pilot program might
consider including two additional sources of information: an interview
with the magistrate judge, and a sample of the magistrate judge's recent
written orders.
165
Reappointment panels already have the option to interview an in-
cumbent magistrate judge.' 66 In the pilot program, we would suggest
using an interview to flesh out any concerns about the collected informa-
tion and allow the magistrate judge to provide any additional information
that might not be evident from the data, such as an irregular docket or an
unusually demanding or notorious case. The interview might also pre-
view the panel's perceptions of the magistrate judge's strengths and
weaknesses, and foster discussion (at least at a basic level) about future
efforts for continuous professional improvement. Accordingly, the opti-
mal time for an interview is some time after the panel has collected sur-
vey and case management data. All collected information should be
forwarded to the magistrate judge in advance of the interview so he or
she has an opportunity to review it ahead of time.
This pilot program might also consider collecting samples of the
magistrate judge's orders for review. The purpose of this review is two-
fold. First, it allows those charged with reappointment to determine
whether the magistrate judge's orders and opinions are sufficiently clear
and understandable. It goes without saying that when any judge ex-
presses him or herself in writing, the attorneys and litigants who review
the opinion should understand without any hesitation the precise scope of
the judge's ruling, and how the judge reached that result. Put another
way, the parties should be clear about what happens next in their case.
163. Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice": Inventing the Federal District
Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 676
(2002).
164. Id.
165. While discussed here solely in the context of magistrate judges, self-evaluations and
review of written orders could obviously be piloted, and, if successful, employed in any JPE pro-
gram for federal district judges, bankruptcy, judge, and the like.
166. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 161, at 30.
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But this concern goes beyond the parties; even those with no interest in a
particular case outcome should be able to read an opinion and understand
the judge's reasoning.
The second purpose behind reviewing written orders is to ensure
that the magistrate judge is relying on sound legal reasoning. By this we
do not mean a "correct" decision in the substantive sense-that determi-
nation is the province of the district or appellate courts or both. Rather,
the review for JPE purposes is somewhat more high-level: has the magis-
trate judge provided adequate citation to legal authority? Did the magis-
trate judge set out the relevant facts and evidence on which he or she
relies for the decision? And is there a logical flow to the reasoning in the
opinion?
While we have described this pilot with specific reference to magis-
trate judges, it could apply with limited modifications to the evaluation
of bankruptcy judges as well. Reappointment decisions concerning
bankruptcy judges, for example, do not require the use of advisory pan-
els, but the practice of providing evaluation information to the ultimate
reappointment authority would remain the same.
As with the first pilot, a pilot program using this model should be
evaluated for its effectiveness. Because this proposed model builds on
the first pilot, each of the effectiveness measurements used for the first
pilot are equally appropriate here. In addition, one might examine the
effectiveness of this pilot study by attempting to measure the value of a
face-to-face interview to both the magistrate judge and the reappointment
panel, the value to the reappointment panel of reviewing the magistrate
judge's sample of written orders, and the overall value of the collected
information on the magistrate judge to the reappointment panel.
C. Pilot Proposal Number Three: Commission-Based Evaluations
A final proposed pilot program-again, one of dozens of possible
variations--combines the emphasis on broader data collection in the
proposed magistrate judge pilot with an additional element frequently
used in state JPE programs: an independent commission to conduct the
evaluation. The inclusion of an independent commission may serve
three purposes. First, commission members may provide a perspective
on the judge's professional strengths and weaknesses that might not be
directly apparent to the judge, even if both the judge and the commission
are reviewing the same performance-related information. Second, the
commission can process the collected information and summarize it in a
form that is more easily digestible than survey and case management
data, and a potentially unwieldy number of comments. Finally, and per-
haps most importantly, an independent commission may provide an im-
primatur of balance and public oversight that simply cannot be achieved
by even the most conscientious internal evaluation.
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By "independent commission" we mean a volunteer commission at
the district court level composed of a roughly equal number of attorneys
and non-attorneys. This balance has proven to be successful at the state
level, 167 and a similar format is used for magistrate judge reappointment
panels. 68 Attorneys have the most consistent direct experience with the
court and should have reasonable expectations about the nature of the
judicial process. Attorneys may also provide legal expertise during the
evaluation process and are in a position to explain the intricacies of a
court's docket to laypersons. Non-attorneys provide a community per-
spective in the evaluation process, and help assure that the final evalua-
tions are presented in a straightforward and non-technical manner. Both
groups also add to the ultimate legitimacy of the evaluations. If only
attorneys were involved, the process might be criticized as an "inside
job" in which members of the legal community simply protect their
own. 169 Citizen involvement strengthens both the perception of the pro-
gram and the final product. As one early commentator on JPE put it:
The key to any successful program of judicial evaluation is ac-
tive lay participation-people working in concert or as a part of
a co-ordinated effort with the legal profession in a broadly based
citizens' effort to assist the voters in making those important de-
cisions on critical judicial positions.
170
If no attorneys were involved, however, evaluations might equally
be criticized as the product of those who have little or no familiarity with
the legal system or the role of judges. Finally, the inclusion of non-
attorneys carries the additional benefit of fostering greater community
understanding of the role of the judge. At least one study has shown that
non-attorneys who are involved in the evaluation process walked away
from it with a better sense of what judges do.
171
For purposes of testing a JPE program in a pilot setting, it is suffi-
cient to assemble a dedicated and balanced group of ten to twelve volun-
teers who are willing to review the relevant information provided by the
167. As of 2008, all seven states with comprehensive JPE programs (Alaska, Arizona, Colo-
rado, Kansas, New Mexico, Tennessee and Utah) utilize a commission with roughly equal represen-
tation of attorneys and laypersons.
168. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 161, at 12.
169. See A. John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona: Goals, Practical Effects
and Concerns, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643, 648-49 (1998); John M. Roll, Merit Selection: The Arizona
Experience, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 837, 878-79 (1990). The same criticisms have emerged where evalua-
tions are conducted by Judicial Councils or otherwise controlled by the judiciary itself. The State of
Utah, for example, instituted a JPE program in 1984 under the auspices of its Judicial Council,
which consists of twelve judges and one attorney. That approach came under fire in the mid-2000's
and was a major consideration undertaken by the state's Judicial Retention Task Force in 2007. In
March 2008, Utah passed new JPE legislation that, among other things, entmsted evaluations to a
commission composed of attorneys and non-attorneys. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A- 12-201 (2008).
170. Henry T. Reath, Judicial Evaluation-The Counterpart to Merit Selection, 60 A.B.A. J.
1246, 1247(1974).
171. See, e.g., Anne Rankin Mahoney, Citizen Evaluation of Judicial Performance: The Colo-
rado Experience, 72 JUDICATURE 210, 216 (1989).
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Clerk of the Court (i.e., the survey data, self-evaluation, and sample of
written orders) and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (case
management data), collectively discuss the judge's strengths and weak-
nesses that come out in the collected information, and draft a short report
describing their conclusions as to the judge's performance. The inde-
pendent commission may also wish to collect information itself from two
additional sources: courtroom observation and a judicial self-evaluation.
Courtroom observation may be performed by members of the inde-
pendent commission or by additional courtroom observers specially
trained for that purpose. 172  There are advantages to either approach.
Where commission members themselves conduct the observations, they
can witness directly the judge's courtroom behavior and the behavior the
judge expects (and tolerates) from attorneys, witnesses, and jurors.
Commission members who do their own observations are also more
likely to internalize the challenges a judge may face in the courtroom-
crowded dockets, emotionally distraught litigants, unprepared counsel,
and so on-that may not be apparent from paper reports on the judge.
Independent observers, by contrast, are less likely to be recognized by
the judge (assuring that the judge's behavior is not altered by the knowl-
edge that a commission member is in the courtroom), and may have
fewer preconceived notions about the judge before entering the court-
room.
In the Colorado judges survey, trial judges overwhelmingly sup-
ported regular courtroom observation. Forty-eight percent of the judges
stated that courtroom observation was "very useful" in the JPE process,
and another 40% stated that such observation was "somewhat useful."'
' 73
Only 12% were neutral on the issue, and no judge indicated that observa-
tion was not useful. 174 Indeed, the judges practically pleaded for more
observation as part of the process,175 noting among other things that ob-
172. The State of Alaska, for example, has used a special corps of courtroom observers who
are trained in advance and are required to couch their observations in specific categories of prede-
termined, process-oriented criteria. As many as fifteen observers are assigned to each judge. Each
observer is given approximately forty hours of advance training, and the observers are directed to sit
in courtroom proceedings at unscheduled intervals. They observe both criminal and civil cases and
proceedings ranging from arraignments and motion hearings to full jury trials. The observers' notes
are collected into a report for each judge, which specifies the number of observations, types of
events and cases observed, the total number of hours the judge was observed, and the average rating
the judge received in each category. The final reports are then forwarded to the Alaska Judicial
Council for consideration as part of the judge's overall evaluation. See ALASKA JUDICIAL
OBSERVERS 2006 BIENNIAL REPORT 1-8 (on file with authors), available at http://www.ajc.state.
ak.us IRetention2006/JudicialObservers2006.pdf.
173. THE BENCH SPEAKS, supra note 79, at 20.
174. Id.
175. Colorado's JPE program requires that each commission member directly observe at least
three judges up for evaluation in unannounced courtroom visits. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-
103(l)(k) & -105(l)(c) (2008); Jane B. Howell, Executive Director, Colorado Office of Judicial
Performance Evaluation, Presentation on Colorado Commissions on Judicial Performance (Aug.
2008), http://www.courts.state.co.us/Media/Law_School.cfm (select link for "Judicial Performance
and Retention Presentation") (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
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servation would be enhanced further if the observer were to meet with
the judge immediately afterward to ask any questions about what oc-
curred. One judge summarized the feelings of a majority of respondents
as follows:
Observation is particularly useful if the judge does not know
the individual or does not know that the observer is present in
the courtroom. In our district, a courtroom can be observed by
security officers over closed circuit TV. Another way is to ap-
pear during a busy docket day when the courtroom is full. I
think the observer should arrange to sit down with the judge
after observing him or her and ask questions about things ob-
served to be sure there is no misunderstanding-particularly if
the observer is a lay person.1
76
The developers of the pilot program may also consider introducing
a judicial self-evaluation. It should be designed with two purposes in
mind: to allow each judge to consider his or her strengths and weak-
nesses on the bench in private reflection, and to help the independent
commission determine whether the judge's perception of those strengths
and weaknesses comport with the strengths and weaknesses identified by
others. The first purpose recognizes that even the most conscientious
judge committed to continuous professional improvement is more likely
to succeed when he or she takes time to assess his or her skill set on a
regular basis. The second purpose ensures that there is no disparity be-
tween the judge's perception of his or her skills (positive or negative)
and the perception of those who interact with the judge in the courtroom.
A common complaint among judges is that self-evaluation lacks
real meaning, because all judges feel pressure to rate themselves as
highly as possible. 177  Indeed, an average or below average self-
evaluation in any category may invite questions from the commission,
even if all other data indicate that the judge is above average in that cate-
gory. There is, of course, little that can be done to assure that all judges
approach the self-evaluation openly and honestly. But those who do
should derive a benefit much greater than those who are inclined to in-
flate their self-assessments.
The pilot program can help promote sincere self-evaluations by
considering making available mentorship programs that foster self-
improvement. Here, the State of Arizona provides a model. Each judge
who is evaluated is assigned to a "conference team" composed of another
judge, a member of the state bar, and a member of the public. 78 The
judge meets with the conference team to discuss his or her strengths,
176. THE BENCH SPEAKS, supra note 79, at 21.
177. Id. at 21-22.
178. See Pelander, supra note 169, at 690.
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weaknesses, and areas for improvement based on the self-evaluation,
survey results, and public comments. Together, the judge and his or her
conference team prepare and sign a written self-improvement plan. 79 By
rule, no member of the conference team may participate in formal
evaluation of the judge.
1 80
Similar to Arizona, a federal JPE pilot program might choose to use
judicial self-evaluations as a teaching and self-improvement tool rather
than as a formal component of the magistrate judge's evaluation. The
conference team model, which uses the information gleaned from the
evaluation process but is more hands-on and more private than a formal
evaluation, should encourage magistrate judges to be thoughtful and
honest in their self-assessments.
Regardless of whether the judge being evaluated is a district judge,
magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge, the independent commission
should endeavor to collect as much of the specified information as possi-
ble during the data collection phase. If all information is not available
for a certain judge, however, the commission may still proceed with the
evaluation and note in its report what information was missing.
Once again, an effectiveness study should follow a pilot program of
this type. In addition to the measurements described for the first and
second proposed pilots, an effectiveness study here should consider
measuring the time and money expended by the independent commis-
sion, the commission members' perception of the process, the value each
judge placed on completing the self-evaluation, the number of times each
judge was observed in the courtroom, the value to both the judge and the
commission of the courtroom observation, and the overall value to the
judge of receiving an independent analysis of his or her performance
data.
TV. BEYOND PILOT PROGRAMS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
It is our hope that suitable testing of JPE through a variety of pilot
programs in one or more districts will more rigorously define the con-
tours of successful judicial performance evaluation at the federal level.
A successful pilot program in one district, however, may not translate
cleanly to another district, or to a national program encompassing all
ninety-four districts. A pilot program may also be able to sidestep cer-
tain structural and administrative issues that become more pressing-and
more complex-when extrapolated to a national program. The develop-
ment of a more permanent and expansive federal JPE program, then,
ultimately will require consideration of several additional factors. Here
we discuss five such factors: the administration of a national JPE pro-
179. Id. at 692; see also ARIZ. JUD. PERF. REV. R. 4(o.
180. See Pelander, supra note 169, at 693.
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gram; the development of national rules governing such a program; the
structure and use of independent commissions; the frequency of evalua-
tions; and the degree to which evaluation results should be publicly dis-
seminated.
A. Authorization and Administration
A nationwide program of JPE in the federal courts would plainly
benefit from some degree of centralized administration. A single author-
ity can exercise greater control over both inputs (e.g., uniform survey
questions, case management data, and operating procedures) and outputs
(e.g., format of evaluation reports, methods of disseminating evaluation
results if applicable). A centralized authority also may find it easier to
run comparative analyses across districts, to confirm (for example) that
the level of survey responses is reasonably consistent.
Judges would presumably be more comfortable if any national ad-
ministration of a federal JPE program rested within the judiciary itself.
Excellent resources within the judicial branch for developing and operat-
ing a national program are already in place. In one formulation, the Ju-
dicial Conference of the United States might be tasked with overseeing
the program and developing national rules and procedures; the FJC with
developing appropriate surveys and conducting research into the effec-
tiveness of JPE across districts; the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts with providing case management data; and the Circuit Clerks with
collecting all the relevant data for each evaluated judge in the circuit and
providing that information to the judge, appointing authority, and inde-
pendent commission as appropriate.
A coordinated effort within the federal courts to develop and im-
plement a robust JPE program would require both commitment and lead-
ership from the judiciary. But it would also assure greater judicial con-
trol over the process and would demonstrate to the American public that
federal judges are sincere about improving their performance on the
bench and committed to their role as public servants. By contrast, the
potential consequence of a tepid judicial response is a strong-and per-
haps unwelcome-legislative response. Titles 18 and 28 of the U.S.
Code are littered with statutory responses to perceived failures of the
federal judiciary to address issues invoking accountability. The Speedy
Trial Act' 81 reflects legislative impatience with the judicial use of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 50(b).182 The Judicial Conduct and Disabil-
ity Act arose in part as a response to the failure of Judicial Councils to
use their (admittedly vague) authority to deal with issues of judicial mis-
181. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2008).




conduct under the pre-1980 version of 28 U.S.C. § 332.183 The Civil
Justice Reform Act was in part a Congressional response to the percep-
tion that district courts were not sufficiently achieving cost and delay
reduction through case management.184  And the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998 suggests legislative frustration with the pace of
alternative dispute resolution implementation in the federal courts.' 85
When the judicial branch demonstrates strong leadership in areas of
transparency and accountability, however, Congress is less likely to pass
reactionary legislation. The Judicial Conference's mandated use of con-
flict disclosure software, for example, probably prevented a legislative
push for a statutory mandate.186 A similar mandate concerning seminar
disclosure requirements may be sufficient to defeat a proposed legislative
amendment to the pending federal judicial salary legislation to ban atten-
dance at non-judicial seminars altogether. 87 And broad legislative de-
mand for cameras in the courtroom in at least the lower federal courts
may be dampened by the experimental posting of audio files of trial court
proceedings on the federal court's PACER website.188
Judicial leadership and judicial administration of a federal JPE pro-
gram, then, may well make sense. A statutory structure, however, does
not entirely lack merit. We note that in most states in which JPE is suc-
cessful, it rests upon a legislative foundation. Moreover, thoughtful leg-
islation may carry certain advantages. First, a JPE program may engen-
der greater public confidence when it is not administered by the judiciary
itself. No matter how well-meaning or thoughtfully constructed a judi-
cially operated JPE program might be, from the citizen perspective the
evaluations are to some degree less credible when judges are the only
parties involved in their own evaluations.' 89 Second, a statute provides
backbone to a program; it may be somewhat more difficult to change
than a set of rules or guidelines, and accordingly may provide a more
183. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking under the Judicial Councils Reform and
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 291-94 (1982) (describing the
legislative history of the Act and the concerns of some that the Judicial Councils were unwilling to
exercise existing power).
184. See, e.g., Mary Brigid McManamon, Is the Recent Frenzy of Civil Justice Reform a Cure-
All or a Placebo? An Examination of the Plans of Two Pilot Districts, 11 REV. LrIG. 329, 332
(1992).
185. 28 U.S.C. § 651 (2008).
186. The Third Branch, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C. Transpar-
ency Takes Shape (Dec. 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/12-06/transparency/index.
html; see also Linda Greenhouse, Federal Judges Take Steps to Improve Accountability, N.Y.
TtMES, Sep. 20, 2006, at A20.
187. See Greenhouse, supra note 186; see also Charles Lane, Judges Alter Rules for Sponsored
Trips, WASH. POST, Sep. 20, 2006, at A23.
188. See News Release, U.S. Courts, Pilot Project Begins: Two Courts Offer Digital Audio
Recordings Online (Aug. 6, 2007) (on file with authors).
189. See Jean E. Dubofsky, Judicial Performance Review: A Balance Between Judicial Inde-
pendence and Public Accountability, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 334 (2007) ("[J]udges' own
evaluations often are too self-serving; no one can possibly be as good as some judges think they
are.").
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consistent model for judicial performance than might otherwise be avail-
able. Individual rules and guidelines can of course be authorized by the
legislative framework, and such guidelines can be adjusted with greater
frequency while leaving the framework in place. 90 Third, a statute
represents, at its best, a triumph of communication between two branches
of government, and between the citizens and their courts. It should be a
product of discussion between elected representatives, the courts, and the
public, based on careful thought and discussion about what it means to
evaluate judges as public servants.'91 Finally, legislation would promote
a certain degree of transparency about the purpose of the JPE program;
debates concerning the legislation become part of the public record, and
the statute itself is widely available. If the goals of the program and the
criteria for evaluation are clearly delineated, the statute itself can be a
self-contained civics lesson on what the public can expect from its fed-
eral judiciary.
We are cognizant of the concerns-voiced most recently by Justice
Wells-that legislative authorization opens the door to legislative mis-
chief.192 And in discussing the perceived advantages and disadvantages
to legislative versus judicial authorization of a federal JPE program, we
do not take a position that one approach is preferable. A robust program
created and designed under the auspices of the judiciary, with active
leadership and buy-in from the entire federal bench, would be expected
to gain considerable public support and plaudits for the courts' commit-
ment to transparency and accountability.
B. Rules and Procedures
Depending on the frequency and complexity of pilot JPE programs,
rules and guidelines governing those programs may reasonably be set at
the district or circuit level. Indeed, this sort of experimentation may be
encouraged as a means of developing JPE rules and practices that best
meet with the performance improvement needs of the judges and the
190. We discuss the ability to change or amend rules and guidelines in greater detail in Part
IV(B) infra.
191. We fully recognize that the process of crafting legislation is inherently political and that
even the most careful strategies and thoughtful suggestions are not immune from criticism and
compromise. But that sober conclusion warrants greater involvement in the process, not less. Two
recent legislative amendments to state JPE programs illustrate the point. In Utah, the Task Force on
Judicial Retention considered changes to the state's program through the fall of 2007 before a bill
was introduced in the state senate in early 2008. The Task Force was composed of members of both
houses of the state legislature and three state court representatives, including the Chief Justice. See
Minutes of the Judicial Retention Election Task Force (Aug. 14, 2007) (on file with authors). While
it is not fair to say that every member of the Task Force walked away from the experience with
everything he or she wanted, the discussion only benefitted the final legislative outcome. Similarly,
the respective chairs of Colorado's Senate and House Judiciary Committees held open meetings
throughout the summer and fall of 2007 to receive input on the reenactment of that state's JPE stat-
ute. The interests of the courts, attorneys' groups, legal organizations, think tanks and private indi-
viduals were considered during these initial meetings and throughout the legislative process. The
bill that ultimately became law, while perfect to no one, was nevertheless largely acceptable to all.
192. See generally Wells, supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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information-seeking needs of appointment authorities, chief judges, or
the public. In a national program, however, a uniform set of national
rules and guidelines should be considered, perhaps to be developed by
the Judicial Conference. Such rules might set out the purposes of the
JPE program, criteria for evaluation, process of collecting data, person(s)
eligible to view the collected data on each judge, and procedures for pre-
paring a report if an independent commission is used.
A provision for future amendment might also be included in the
rules. Amendments should not go into effect immediately, for the obvi-
ous reasons that independent commissions would require time to prepare
for changes to the data collection or the evaluation procedure, and judges
subject to evaluation would require adequate notice of a procedural
change. Judicial performance evaluations only have professional devel-
opment impact if each judge is presented with clear and comprehensible
criteria for the evaluation ahead of time. Put another way, judges cannot
be expected to hit a constantly moving target.
C. Use and Composition of Independent Commissions
If pilot studies suggest that a national program should use inde-
pendent commissions, the rules should set out the composition and reach
of those commissions. As discussed above, for pilot purposes it may be
sufficient to seek out volunteers in rough balance of attorneys and non-
attorneys. In a more fixed program, however, consideration should be
given also to balancing a commission by appointing authority, and per-
haps to achieving partisan balance as well. The judiciary may wish to
appoint all commissioners itself. Or the rules could institute a model in
use in some states, in which appointments are shared among all three
branches of government. Some appointment authority may also be in-
vested in groups outside the federal government that have an investment
in the success of the courts, such as the Faculty of Federal Advocates or
a local bar association. No matter how appointments are broken down,
additional balance can be achieved by staggering the terms of each com-
mission member so that no appointing authority has the power to pack
the commission with new appointees at any given time. 193
D. Frequency of Evaluations
A judge is likely only to be evaluated once or twice during the
course of a pilot program. In a more permanent program, however, regu-
lar intervals should be set for the evaluation of each judge. Evaluations
should be conducted with sufficient frequency that improvements and
continuing strengths are well-documented, and weaknesses or difficulties
are identified and diagnosed quickly. Depending on the stated goals of a
193. For a more extensive discussion of best practices for the composition of independent
commissions at the state level, see SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 8, at 81-82.
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final JPE program, evaluations for magistrate and bankruptcy judges
might be timed to provide reasonably current data to assist with reap-
pointment decisions. For example, districts that employ part-time magis-
trate judges with four-year terms might evaluate those magistrate judges
three years after their initial appointments and three years after each re-
appointment. 194
Full-time magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges might be evalu-
ated more often. More frequent evaluation would serve two purposes.
First, it would identify the judge's strengths and weaknesses on an early
and continuing basis, providing more time and opportunity for profes-
sional development than might be the case if the judge was only evalu-
ated once each term. Second, multiple evaluations are more likely to
show improvement or lack of improvement in certain areas over time,
making aberrations in data or dockets less likely than might be the case if
only one evaluation is conducted.
The timing of evaluations for district judges with life tenure is less
obvious, because there are no reappointment decisions or other temporal
cues. However, there are strong arguments for maintaining a pattern of
regular evaluations similar to those proposed for magistrate judges. One
format might be to evaluate district judges two years after initially taking
the bench, and every three years thereafter. District judges with senior
status could also be evaluated every three years. This scheme has been
used at the state level where judges are similarly appointed with no fixed
terms. In New Hampshire, for example, Superior Court and District
Court judges face evaluation at least once every three years. 95 Similarly,
in Massachusetts, trial judges are evaluated at least once every three
years. 196
Evaluation every three years makes sense from a professional de-
velopment perspective. As is the case with magistrate judges, regular
evaluation of district judges helps to identify and address weaknesses
more quickly. Regular evaluation also can be used to demonstrate a pat-
tern of individual improvement. It can pinpoint areas for more wide-
spread judicial education if a number of evaluations suggest collective
strengths and weaknesses across the court. Finally, when evaluations are
conducted on a frequent and consistent basis, the natural level of stress
associated with such evaluations (for the judge being evaluated, but also
194. This timing scheme would allow sufficient time for a thorough evaluation (and, if re-
quested, a recommendation on reappointment) based on three years of the magistrate judge's per-
formance. It would also afford the magistrate judge a full year before reappointment to address any
weaknesses identified in the evaluation.
195. See News Advisory, New Hampshire Judiciary, 2002 Judicial Performance Evaluations
Released (Jul. 11, 2003) (on file with authors) available at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/
press/pr030611 .htm.
196. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 211, § 26A (2008) (setting evaluation intervals of twelve to eight-
een months for judges with four years of experience or less, and evaluation intervals of eighteen to
thirty-six months for judges with more than four years of experience).
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for members of the bar and court staff who must interact with the judge
on a regular basis) may be diluted.
E. Dissemination of Evaluation Results
Public dissemination of evaluation results historically has been a
difficult aspect of JPE for judges to stomach. And there are certainly
circumstances in which the release of a judge's evaluation may be un-
wise.197 But the importance of circulating evaluation results to the gen-
eral public should not be underestimated, and should be considered care-
fully for inclusion in any final program of judicial performance evalua-
tion. Indeed, there are at least five advantages to broad sharing of re-
sults. First, regular dissemination of judicial evaluations reinforces ap-
propriate criteria by which the public should measure its judges. Rather
than considering a judge to be "good" or "bad" based on his or her han-
dling of a particularly difficult or controversial case (the types of cases
most likely to be covered by the media)-or worse, the outcome of a
particularly politicized case-the lay public may begin to base its as-
sessment of judicial quality on the judge's clarity of expression, ability to
manage his or her docket efficiently, and demonstrated command of pro-
cedural rules and substantive law.
Second, to the extent the public is aware that evaluations are being
conducted, knowledge of the program may increase transparency and
foster public confidence in the court system. Transparency would in fact
be increased along two dimensions: the courts demonstrate that they are
willing to be subject to evaluation as a means of fostering continuous
improvement in their role as public servants, and the evaluation commis-
sion demonstrates that its evaluation process was open, thorough, and in
line with its role as a representative of the people.
198
197. If, for example, the judge retires or resigns after the evaluation is conducted but before the
date scheduled for its release, there is little value in making the evaluation public. This approach has
precedent at the state level. Colorado has a longstanding requirement that judges be shown their
final evaluation and "narrative profile" (a short form of the evaluation for inclusion in voter guides)
at least 45 days before they must declare their intent to seek retention. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-5.5-
106(1)(a)(V) & (2)(A)(3) (2008). Judges who resign from the bench or do not declare their intent to
seek retention do not have their evaluations circulated or placed in the voter guide. In 2008, the
state's JPE legislation was amended to require the state's Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation
to issue a statewide statistical report thirty days before the election, setting forth the total number of
justices and judges who were eligible to stand for retention, the total number of evaluations per-
formed by the state and district commissions, the total number of justices or judges who were evalu-
ated but did not stand for retention, and the total number of justices and judges recommended for
retention. See id. §§ 13-5.5-l03(l)(q)(I)-(1V).
198. One commentator recently observed in a discussion of judicial nominating commissions:
A lack of transparency is highly damaging to the public's perception of the commission
system. In the absence of information regarding proceedings, the public tends to think
that the system is 'closed,' and that judges are selected through 'the old-boy system' or
some other process that has little to do with the qualifications of the candidate. Such per-
ceptions undermine the confidence in the quality of judges and ultimately in the quality
of the legal system.
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Third, public confidence is also promoted by the simple fact that
most judges historically do well on evaluations, and the federal bench-
given the increased salaries, prestige, and difficulty of appointment-
should shine in this area. Certainly at the state level, judges selected
through a competitive appointive process tend to do well on evalua-
tions.199 Federal district judges in particular, whose initial qualifications
were sufficient to elicit a Presidential appointment and Senate confirma-
tion, are presumed to be well-qualified to take the bench. Dissemination
of evaluation results serves both to confirm this presumption, and to
demonstrate that each judge is motivated to grow and improve on the
bench.
Fourth, for those judges who do not receive a strong evaluation,
public dissemination may serve as motivation to improve performance.
Indeed, it may be the single strongest source of motivation. Federal dis-
trict judges do not face the danger of being removed in an election; only
personal standards of excellence and the risk of public embarrassment
align a judge toward continued improvement on the bench. For most
judges (state and federal), personal drive is enough. For those few
judges who have lost their enthusiasm for the job, however, publication
of poor evaluation results might provide the appropriate kick-start to
either dedicate oneself to rapid professional improvement, or resign from
the bench if that dedication is lacking.
Finally, widespread dissemination assures that the information the
public actually receives on its judges is comprehensive and accurate.
Public awareness of the federal judiciary has been influenced by the pro-
liferation of media coverage for judicial nominations, confirmation hear-
ings, and infamous cases.200  Furthermore, in recent years an increasing
number of websites have emerged that either target specific judges201 or
ask for anonymous and unedited comments on a wide range of judges.0 2
Jeffrey D. Jackson, Beyond Quality: First Principles in Judicial Selection and Their Application to a
Commission-Based System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 125, 157 (2007). The identical point applies to
judicial evaluation commissions-full disclosure of the evaluation process and the identities of the
commission members promotes public understanding of the system and confidence therein.
199. Alaska, for example, has utilized merit selection since statehood and has used a JPE
program since 1975. During that time, only three judges have not been recommended for retention,
in part because of the careful efforts of the nomination commission to recommend highly qualified
candidates. Bill Gordon, Member, Alaska Judicial Council, Remarks at IAALS Symposium: Judi-
cial Performance Evaluation: Strategies for Success (Aug. 5, 2008) (notes of remarks on file with
authors).
200. This list of federal cases generating high media interest in the last several years alone is
extensive and springs easily to mind, particularly in the areas of accused corporate malfeasance,
criminal activity by celebrities, or terrorism. The judges presiding over these cases have found
themselves under an unexpected (and uninvited) microscope, with greatly increased public scrutiny.
201. E.g., Impeach Judge Turk!, http://www.anusha.com/turk.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008);
Ten Federal Judges Who Must Be Impeached for Abuse of Power, http://home.earthlink.net/
-dlaw70/top 1O.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
202. See, e.g., The Robing Room, http://www.therobingroom.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
The website describes itself as "a site by lawyers for lawyers." Id. Their mission is "to provide a
forum for evaluating federal district court judges and magistrate-judges." Id. Lawyers are encour-
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The evaluations on these sites are at best unscientific and anecdotal, re-
flecting only the comments of a self-selected group; at worst, they are
factually incorrect and motivated by personal bias rather than any dispas-
sionate evaluation. JPE, by contrast, holds both the judges and the
evaluation process itself to rigorous standards, creating a system in which
both the public and the judiciary can be confident.
CONCLUSION
If thoughtfully implemented, a JPE program holds great promise
both for the federal judiciary and for those who use and rely on the fed-
eral courts to preserve their rights and resolve their disputes. Pilot pro-
grams, drawn from elements of successful programs at the state level,
may be useful in developing a program tailored to the unique needs of
the federal system. A well-constructed JPE program would help locate
judicial accountability where it belongs-in the process of adjudica-
tion-rather than in public or Congressional reaction to case outcomes.
Ultimately, for any JPE program to be accepted and functional, it
must be embraced both by federal judges and the public they serve. In-
dividual judges will need to step forward as leaders in this enterprise.
The benefits of doing so-reframing judicial accountability, preserving
judicial independence, and building public confidence in the courts-
suggest that such an effort would be well worthwhile.
aged to provide numerical ratings or comment on individual judges. See id. Commenters' e-mail
addresses are collected, but no names are displayed in connection with the comments. See id. For a
similar example, see Robe Probe, http://www.robeprobe.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
2008]

